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ABSTRACT 
 
Many cities have tried different solutions to develop the city economically.  The creative 
capital model of economic development is gaining acceptance as a viable model of development 
for city planners and mayors (Dreher 2002; Kratke 2010; Long 2009; Peck 2007; Ponzini and 
Rossi 2010).  According to Florida (2002) a city should attract what he termed creative people to 
aid the city’s economic development.  These creative class individuals will bring their creative 
ideas to the city, which will then attract businesses to the city.  The arrival of businesses and 
creative class individuals should create an economic and social panacea for the city.  Many 
studies have examined the economic benefits of the creative capital model (McGranahan and 
Wojan’s 2007; Lee, Florida, and Acs 2004; Ward 2007), but few studies have examined how the 
social aspects of life would be affected by the creative capital model.  The current study used 
data from the U.S. Census Bureau and the FBI Uniform Crime report to examine the effects of 
creative capital on social development.  Urban and suburban counties were examined with age 
structure, creative segregation, creative exposure, and crime.  The findings indicate that the 
creative capital model produces segregation along class lines, exposure to creative class ideas has 
been overstated by Florida, and the age structure of the city affects the creativity in the county.  
Crime may be reduced in creative areas, but with increased segregation some areas may 
experience an increase in crime.       
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, Whirlpool announced that it was closing its manufacturing plant in Newton, 
Iowa, which employed 1,000 workers.  The closure came after Whirlpool acquired the Newton 
plant from rival manufacturer Maytag.  In October 2009, Electrolux announced that the company 
would close all manufacturing plants in Iowa.  Electrolux closed a plant in Jefferson in 2010, and 
a plant in Webster City stopped operations in 2011.  Electrolux moved the plants to Juarez, 
Mexico along with the 850 jobs the plants had employed in Iowa.  
Closures of manufacturing plants are a common occurrence as the United States has 
begun a shift in its economy from manufacturing to service (Cooke 2002; Rutten 2003).  With 
this shift, cities throughout the United States have had to adjust to the new work economy.  In 
2007, the United States experienced the largest economic downturn since the Great Depression.  
This served to compound the problems caused by plant closures.  The Great Recession set in, and 
many people lost their jobs and homes.  Americans across the country could no longer live in the 
same manner they had in the past.     
The current recession has a large impact for many communities around the country.  The 
suburbs, once a safe haven from the negative social ills of the city, are now becoming more like 
the cities from which they have tried to isolate themselves.  One of the consequences for many 
suburbs is increased crime.  For instance, suburbs of Charlotte, North Carolina have experienced 
a significant increase in crime in recent years: 
Charlottes’ crime rates have stayed flat overall in recent years – but from 2003 to 2006, 
in the 10 suburbs of the city that have experienced the highest foreclosure rates, crime 
rose 33 percent.  Civic organizations in some suburbs have begun to mow the lawns 
around empty houses to keep up the appearance of stability.  Police departments are 
mapping foreclosures in an effort to identify emerging criminal hot spots. (Leinberger 
2008) 
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Citizens of Tampa and St. Petersburg are expecting similar increases in crime due to the 
increased foreclosure rates.   
The foreclosure crisis engulfing neighborhoods across the Tampa Bay area is a sign to 
most people of a distressed economy. But to the law enforcement officers who patrol 
these neighborhoods, the empty homes represent something else entirely: a haven for 
crime. Scattered in the central neighborhoods of St. Petersburg and Tampa, or in the 
zombie subdivisions that dot the exurbs of Hillsborough and Pasco counties, abandoned 
homes provide a place for thieves to stash their stolen goods and for addicts to get high, 
authorities say. (Van Sickler and Thalji 2010) 
 
Florida was hit the hardest by the economic downturn, with a foreclosure rate of nearly 20 
percent, which was the highest in the country (Christie 2011).   
To combat the growing crime problem in the suburbs, some banks have begun to simply 
knock down foreclosed homes (Florida 2010).  The banks believe that they will lose money 
because housing values in the neighborhood will plummet due to the homeless sleeping in empty 
homes and vandals breaking fixtures in the foreclosed homes.  To prevent the loss of falling 
housing prices, the banks knock down the empty homes and hope to sell the land.    
 In addition to concerns about communities as a whole, specific groups of individuals 
have suffered from the economic downturn.  For instance, uneducated workers may be 
particularly hard hit by the recession.  According to Censky (2011) “in 1980, workers with a high 
school diploma earned about 71% of what college-educated workers made.  In 2010, that number 
fell to 55%.”  Today, a college education can mean the difference between stagnant wages and a 
foreclosed home, or achieving the American Dream.  The downshift in the economy has left 
many uneducated people unable to achieve the material success that is at the core of the 
American Dream. As Messner and Rosenfeld (2001: 68) noted, “a strong achievement 
orientation, a commitment to competitive individualism, universalism, and, most important, the 
glorification of material success – have their underpinnings in the economy”.  People without a 
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college degree are being shut out of the material success to which the educated worker has more 
access.        
 Those that can attain a college degree are now separating themselves both economically 
and socially.  The educated are now working in jobs that Richard Florida (2002a) calls creative 
jobs, and Robert Reich (1991; 2002) calls symbolic-analytic services.  These jobs are knowledge 
based, require a high level of skill, and are high paid. For example, engineers, accountants, 
artists, and professors are symbolic-analytic service occupations.  Some cities have seen an 
increase in the employment of creative workers, by providing creative jobs and thus attracting 
highly educated people to their communities.      
Meanwhile, at the other end of the work spectrum, the uneducated are losing jobs in 
manufacturing.  Traditionally, manufacturing jobs have been unionized and have provided good 
pay and good benefits to their workers.  However, these jobs have been moving to other 
countries or have been rendered obsolete because of technological advances.  Service work is 
now replacing manufacturing work in the United States (Beauregard 1993).  Whereas 
manufacturing jobs provided good income and benefits, service work is typically low paying and 
does not provide satisfactory benefits.    
Florida (2002; 2005; 2008) has suggested that not only do workers have to adjust to the 
new economy, but cities must reinvent themselves as well.  Cities that have not been able to 
attract creative industries will instead see an increase in low end service jobs, such as cashiers, 
hotel employees, and taxi drivers.  This divide between creative cities and service cities has large 
consequences not only for the people of the United States, but for the cities and regions that 
comprise the country.   
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The Tale of Two Cities 
With gently rolling hills, 17 lakes, and 125 miles of biking, hiking, and running trails 
Eden Prairie, Minnesota – a suburb of Minneapolis – seems like to perfect place to settle down.  
Eden Prairie also boasts excellent public schools, low unemployment, and safe streets.  Sitting on 
the banks of the Mississippi River, St. Louis, Missouri also seems like a picturesque city.  Post 
cards often show the St. Louis Arch and the Old Courthouse as the sun sets in the background.  
Even though both cities present themselves as great places to live, they are likely perceived very 
differently by the public.  Eden Prairie was named the “Best Place to Live in America, 2010” by 
CNN (Braverman, Crews, Lee, Levine, Mangla, Richardson, Rosato, and Van Noordennen 
2010), and St. Louis was named the most dangerous city in the United States (CQ Press 2010).   
Lists that rank cities on various characteristics, such as those described above, are very 
easy for the general public to read and understand and are prevalent in the media.  This may be 
why Richard Florida’s (2002a) concept of the creative class (2002a) has become so popular.  The 
quantification of economic and social factors, along with the “tabling of cities” performance on 
these measures contributes to the popularity of Florida’s theories (Berry 2003; Glaeser 2004; 
Lewis and Donald 2010; Peck 2005, 2007).  Moreover, the public image of many cities is 
affected by these rankings in Florida’s tables (Berry 2003; Glaeser 2004; Lewis and Donald 
2010; Peck 2005, 2007) and by inclusion on such lists as the “Best Places to Live in America.”  
Cities across the world have begun to adopt Richard Florida’s model of development, such as 
Wollongong in Australia (Barnes, Waitt, Gill, and Gibson 2006), Copenhagen in Denmark 
(Bayliss 2007), and Austin (McCann 2007) and Milwaukee (Ward 2007) in the United States.     
Scholars have been rating cities on a number of factors for years.  The ratings can range 
from indications of which cities are in the best economic position to which city has the best 
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school systems.  Often these ratings end up in lists in non-academic articles that are posted on 
websites such as Yahoo.com.  Although reading the lists of top party cities (Murphy 2008) or 
best city for singles (Hunt 2010) may be fun to do for entertainment, the lists are often generated 
from larger studies and do have implications.  Mayors and city planners often take steps to make 
their city appear on the lists of best cities in the United States and best places to raise a family, 
while trying to avoid making lists such as the 25 most dangerous cities (CQ 2010) and seven 
cities about to sink (Weiner 2010).   
A step that some have taken to enhance the image of a city has been to try to attract the 
creative class to the city. For instance, former Governor of Iowa and current United States 
Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack launched a “Great Places Initiative” with the hope of 
turning Iowa into the creative capital of the Midwest (Iowa Arts News 2005).  With help from 
Richard Florida, Governor Vilsack held conferences and workshops designed to change Iowa 
from a state that loses jobs and people into a destination area for new businesses and educated 
people to work and live.  
In fact, increasing the number of creative jobs in a city does seem to have implications 
for the image of the city.  As noted above, Eden Prairie, Minnesota and St. Louis, Missouri are 
perceived very differently in the media.  One big difference between Eden Prairie and St. Louis 
is the difference in number of creative jobs.  Minneapolis, of which Eden Prairie is a suburb, has 
fared well in obtaining creative jobs while St. Louis has not been able to attract creative jobs to 
the city.  As Lewis and Donald (2010: 32) stated “cities that are successful in attracting creativity 
will continue to do so and cities that are not have limited chances of reversing their fate”.  
According to Florida (2002a), this is because educated people are flocking to cities like Austin, 
Washington D.C., and Minneapolis.  Meanwhile, the uneducated are living in cities like St. 
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Louis, Detroit, and Buffalo, which are often described as declining or decaying cities.  Economic 
opportunities are low in these cities, and this lack of opportunity may lead to decay, crime, and 
other social ills. 
Scholars in the past have stated that the wealthy will always move away from the poor 
within a city.  Banfield (1968: 23) stated that:  
If the distribution of wealth and income is such that some can afford new housing and the 
time and money to commute considerable distances to work while others cannot, the 
expanding periphery of the city must be occupied by the first group (the “well-off”) while 
the older, inner parts of the city, where most of the jobs are, must be occupied by the 
second group (the “not well-off"). 
  
In the past, uneducated workers could enjoy a certain level of comfort because manufacturing 
provided a good salary and benefits.  A worker in the Maytag or Electrolux plant could afford to 
live in a neighborhood where those with higher levels of education, such as teachers or lawyers, 
also lived.  Today, the low level service worker is no longer able to afford to live in the same 
neighborhood as higher end service workers.  Thus, cities are experiencing segregation based on 
those who are in creative jobs and those who are not.  
Economic Versus Social Development 
Many of the ratings of cities are based only on economic factors.  Former Governor 
Vilsack’s idea to turn Iowa into the creative capital center of the Midwest is guilty of using only 
economic factors to determine the health and vitality of his state.  Economic development is not 
social development.  There are many measures that can describe the health of a city or state that 
are not measurable in economic terms.  Thus, when solely economic factors are considered, it is 
not clear what this type of development means in terms of social factors for the people who live 
in the city and state. 
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For example, Moore and Daday (2010) argued that economic development in a sample of 
sub-Saharan African countries was not aiding the social development in those countries.  
Scholars argued that one of the reasons countries in sub-Saharan Africa were not developing as 
quickly as other countries was because the educational system was not as advanced in Africa.  
Thus, scholars argued that an increase in funding for schools would drastically increase 
development in sub-Saharan Africa.  However, Moore and Daday (2010) demonstrated that no 
development would occur by increasing funding to schools.  There were social problems in the 
region that needed to be addressed before this type of economic development were to work.  For 
instance, social issues that would be difficult to measure economically but that were affecting the 
region included land tenure issues, poor government choices, and disease.  Therefore, social 
development must be taken into account when developing any plan to increase the health of a 
country, state, or city. 
Moreover, scholars have pointed out that many of the lists that Richard Florida creates on 
which to rank cities seem to favor large metropolitan areas (Lewis and Donald 2010).  It is 
unclear if smaller cities could become creative centers that can attract the creative class to them.  
Small cities might not be able to attract creative industries to their area.  Donald and Morrow 
(2003) stated that Canadian cities tend to market the creative areas of the city while ignoring 
budget problems, poor quality of life for the poor, and inequality within the city.  Thus, focusing 
on increasing creative jobs or attracting creative individuals might result in neglect of the social 
concerns of cities. 
Even with the flaws in his theory, Richard Florida remains a highly popular scholar for 
many urban planners and mayors.  Ponzini and Rossi (2010: 1040) stated “despite being 
criticized by academics both in theoretical terms and in terms of their urban and regional 
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applications, the creative city and class theory and discourse have been greatly successful, 
particularly amongst policy-makers and urban leaders.”  Therefore, the present study examines 
the impact of Richard Florida’s theory of the creative class on cities. 
In this study, crime is used  to examine the effect creativity has on a city.  Richard Florida 
(2002, 2005a, 2008) has continually stated that social and economic problems will be solved by 
development based around creativity.  Other studies have examined faults in Florida’s model 
(Bontje and Musterd 2009; Darchen and Tremblay 2010; Kratke 2010; Lewis and Donald 2010; 
Long 2009; Martin-Brelot, Grossetti, Eckert, Gritsai, and Kovacs 2010; Ponzini and Rossi 2010; 
Rutten and Gelissen 2008), but no studies have examined how crime may be affected by.   
Florida (2002a) suggested that one reason why all people within a city benefit from 
creative workers is the interaction creative people will have with each other.  Florida asserted 
that creative workers love to talk and interact with people, and this is precisely how creative 
people generate new ideas.  However, Florida (2002a) provided no evidence that this is the case.  
Moreover, there is no evidence that demonstrates that creative workers are interacting with 
noncreative workers.  The present study used an educational exposure measure to examine if 
Florida’s assertion was accurate. 
Finally, as the creative class workers move to cities, it is not clear what this movement 
means to urban and suburban areas.  Florida (2002a) suggested that creative workers are a great 
economic and social boom for a city, but this has not been proven.  Florida (2002a) goes to great 
lengths in his book to explain how cities that attract the creative workers to them will be the best 
cities in the United States, both economically and socially.  However, it is not clear where 
creative class workers are living within the cities.  It is possible that creative class workers do 
move to trendy downtown districts, but it is also feasible that creative class workers are moving 
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to suburban areas with large houses and big yards.  Moreover, it is not clear if creative class 
workers are living along with noncreative workers, or if the creative class workers are 
segregating themselves within the city.  The current study used a segregation measure to explore 
these possibilities. 
The current study serves as an examination of the movement from manufacturing to 
service work, and its impact on urban areas.  Using Richard Florida’s concept of the creative 
class, the study will explore (1) where the creative class are moving, (2) if crime is prevalent in 
creative class cities, (3) if creative class workers do interact with each other and with noncreative 
workers, and (4) if the creative class workers have segregated themselves from the noncreative 
class workers.  Data was gathered from the United States Census Bureau and the FBI Uniform 
Crime Report (UCR) for the years 1990, 2000, and 2008.  The different time periods were used 
to examine the movement of the creative class over time.  Urban and suburban counties were 
examined along with the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) to view if any differences existed 
between the two areas.           
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CHAPTER TWO:  THEORY 
Creative Capital 
 According to Richard Florida (2002a), the nature of work has changed in the United 
States and for all countries of the West.  The changed economy has created a new development 
model: the creative class.  Florida (2002a) has suggested that for cities to be viable and to be able 
to grow in the future, they must develop along the guidelines that he has set out.  However, as 
will be discussed in this chapter, Florida has not provided a clear definition of the creative class, 
and he has not provided any relevant path for researchers and policy makers to follow. 
Florida pointed out that manufacturing jobs and other blue collar work are now leaving 
the United States for countries in the Global South.  These countries in the Global South can 
produce the same goods as the United States, but for less money.  “There can be little doubt that 
the age we are living through is one of tremendous economic and social transformation” (Florida 
2005a: 3).  What has replaced the blue collar jobs is what Florida has labeled creative capital.     
 According to Florida, the creative capital model is the best model to follow because other 
economic and social models of development are outdated.  Researchers need to understand and 
acknowledge the shift in the economy to produce better models of development.  Traditional 
models have focused on social bonds and networks, such as social capital, but for Florida these 
older models are no longer useful.  Florida (2005a: 31) states: 
The kinds of communities both that we desire and that generate economic prosperity are 
different than those of the past.  Social structures that were important in earlier years now 
work against prosperity.  Traditional notions of what it means to be a close, cohesive 
community and society tend to inhibit economic growth and innovation.    
 
Past models suggested that people wanted strong civic connections in their communities.  
However, today’s people want a more loosely based community where an individual can have 
anonymity, and the neighbors do no ask questions about others’ activities.   
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 The shift in the economy from manufacturing to service has produced employees who 
often work by themselves or from home.  This increased individualism makes communities 
based on social capital or networks overwhelming for the creative class.  According to Florida 
(2002: 235), “centers of the Creative Class are more likely to be economic winners”, while 
“Working Class centers tend to be economically stagnant” and service class centers may be 
growing but “many of these are low-wage dead-end jobs.”   
 The creative class is made up of two groups:  the super-creative core and the creative 
professionals.  The super-creative core is made up of workers, such as “scientists and engineers, 
university professors, poets and novelists, artists, entertainers, actors, designers, and architects” 
(Florida 2005a: 34).  Florida (2005a) went on to state that problem solving and analytical work 
are the bases of the jobs of those in the super-creative core.  The type of work included in the 
creative professional category are workers who “work in a wide range of knowledge-intensive 
industries such as high-tech sectors, financial services, the legal and health-care professions, and 
business management” (Florida 2005a: 34).      
Cities based around knowledge-intensive creative work attract the creative workers, 
because creative class people are choosing where to live and what areas of the country are 
creative enough for them to remain there.  Florida stated “the U.S. working population is re-
sorting itself geographically along class lines” (2002: 241).  The creative class attracts jobs and 
businesses, as the creative class are determining where to live and what amenities each city has.  
Cities that are able to attract the creative class are the cities that ultimately will offer the best 
standard of living, according to Florida.  
Florida’s concept of creative capital has become widely popular among urban planners, 
mayors, and has even gained traction in other countries (Kratke 2010; Ponzini and Rossi 2010).  
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While academics and researchers have pointed out many problems with Florida’s concept of 
creative capital, “in popular media, however, the outpouring of praise has squelched any mention 
of scholarly criticism” (Long 2009: 210).  Long (2009: 210) stated that Florida has “achieved 
near rockstar status”, and Dreher (2002: 1) suggested that Florida has attracted “the type of 
attention usually garnered by salacious fiction or celebrity tell-alls.”  In Florida’s book Who’s 
Your City (2008) Florida has endorsements from Cybill Shepherd and Chef Mario Batali.  These 
celebrities stated how the creative class and Florida’s theory can aid a community to become 
vibrant and growing.  Despite criticism from scholars, cities and states are following Florida’s 
creative capital model and developing “hipsterisation strategies” and are undergoing “creativity 
makeovers” (Peck 2007: 37).  In fact: 
It is difficult to exaggerate the influence of Richard Florida’s notion of the creative class 
on urban and regional economic development strategies across the USA.  Many large 
cities in the USA now have some form of talent attraction strategy in place, in some cases 
involving extensive place marketing aimed at promoting a cosmopolitan and vibrant 
place to live…This thinking is percolating across the Atlantic to the UK and beyond, 
boosted by Florida’s high-profile visits to Europe (Houston, Findlay, Harrison, and 
Mason 2008: 135).  
 
What is Creative Capital? 
Creative capital can be “considered as a complementary approach to the human capital 
model” (Darchen and Tremblay 2010: 256).  Human capital theorists (Glaeser 2004) have argued 
that if the education level of individuals is increased, economic growth will result.  Human 
capital is “any form of acquired skills or knowledge that could be used to improve the 
individual’s ability to perform productive work must be considered capital investments” 
(Abrokwaa 1999: 653).  Sachs (2005: 244) pointed out that human capital is the “health, 
nutrition, and skills needed for each person to be economically productive.”   
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To acquire the skills and knowledge needed for individuals to be economically 
productive, it is essential that the state, city, or neighborhood develop a robust educational 
system (Grosse, Harttgen, and Klasen 2008; Hage, Garnier, and Fuller 1988; Nwonwu 2008).  
Moore and Daday (2010: 285) explained “in theory the development of human capital will then 
produce a population that is attractive to multinational corporations.  The multinational 
corporations will then produce employment opportunities, which will raise the standard of living 
in the country.”  The research on human capital has yielded mixed results, with many scholars 
pointing out both the positive and negative results of human capital on development (Jaffe 1998; 
Nwonwu 2008; Oketch 2005; Sachs 2005; Sommons 1979).    
Florida (2002a) differs from human capital theory by looking at “precise categories of 
human capital” (Darchen and Tremblay 2010: 226).  According to Florida, specific types of 
people are needed to aid in economic and social development, namely, the creative class.  He has 
stated that individuals being trained and educated in fields that are not creative will not aid in 
economic and social development.  On the other hand, the human capital approach considers all 
training and education as positive, even noncreative education and training.  Secondly, Florida 
(2002; 2008) focuses on locational decisions for the creative class.  The creative classes choose 
where to live and then move according to their desires.  Thus, cities, states, and countries need to 
provide amenities that will attract these creative people to the area.  In contrast, human capital 
theory does not claim that the educated will simply leave once a city expands its educational 
system.  The idea behind human capital is that the area that increases its education level will 
benefit, not areas that can provide creative amenities.  Finally, Florida’s creative capital model 
differs from human capital in its focus on other factors that drive development.  For instance, 
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Florida asserted that tolerance – a large foreign born and a thriving homosexual population – will 
increase the social and economic standing of an area.     
 Scholars have criticized Florida because he has not clearly operationalized his concept of 
creative capital.  Ponzini and Rossi (2010: 1040) stated: 
Richard Florida avoids providing detailed prescriptions about how his theory should be 
applied to specific contexts of urban policy:  his work is deliberately open to any kind of 
translation and application in the policy field.  He does not enter, therefore, the complex 
sphere of urban policy and spatial planning and does not attempt to scrutinize the 
multifaceted relationships existing among actors, resources (political, legal, economic) 
and the set of socio-spatial practices co-existing in the urban field. 
 
However, from Florida’s writings it is clear that creative capital is made up of what Florida calls 
the “Three T’s”:  Technology, Talent, and Tolerance.  Communities that are able to acquire large 
amounts of the Three T’s will have increased economic and social development.   
 Technology is defined by Florida (2002) as the number of patents produced by a city.  
Thus, Boston, which produces a large amount of patents in the United States (Strumsky and 
Lobo 2011), has a large amount of technology.  According to Florida, areas with a large amount 
of technology will have an inventive culture in the area.  Therefore, inventors and entrepreneurs 
can bounce ideas off of each other and learn from all the technology around them.  For instance, 
if a creative person produces a great idea, another creative person can then take that idea and 
build upon it. 
 With a large amount of technology present, the community will then be able to attract 
talent to the area.  Talent is operationalized by Florida as the percentage of bachelor’s degrees in 
the city.  According to Florida, the highly educated people drive creativity.  Cities that have a 
large base of people with college degrees will be able to attract jobs.  Businesses will move to 
these cities because these cities has a large base of educated people ready to work without 
15 
 
 
 
requiring much additional training.  Thus, as the talent level increases the employment options 
also increase. 
 Finally, Florida has suggested that tolerance is of great significance to urban and 
community growth.  Florida (2005) stated that tolerance is the most important part of the Three 
T’s.  Other scholars have pointed out that values do produce economic growth (Granato, 
Inglehart, and Leblang 1996; Harrison and Huntington 2000), but Florida differs from previous 
scholars in his conception of tolerance.  When Florida discussed the role of diversity (what he 
refers to as tolerance) he does not mean diversity in terms of people with differing racial/ethnic 
groups and socioeconomic status.  Florida operationalizes tolerance in a number of ways, but all 
his definitions of tolerance include the percentage of foreign born residents and the percentage of 
homosexuals in the community.   
 The city of Memphis has a large African American population, and many researchers 
would agree that it is a diverse city.  However, Florida ranked Memphis as one of the lowest in 
creativity.  In The Flight of the Creative Class (2005b) Florida explained that a large foreign 
born population is one of the best indicators of economic and social growth.  A large number of 
immigrants come to the United States to go to college, and upon graduation will stay in the 
United States to work.  Cities that are able to attract the educated immigrants will see increases 
in technology and talent as new ideas are brought to them.  Cities that cannot attract educated 
immigrants will have the same ideas as before and cannot grow as quickly.   
 To Florida, a large homosexual population is a sign of a city’s openness to different 
groups of people, as many different groups of people will feel comfortable in a city where a large 
homosexual population is accepted.  Immigrants and youth will want to move to a city that is 
accepting of differences.  Moreover, Florida stated that cities with a large homosexual population 
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will have a more vibrant social life.  His reasoning was that this is because the city will have 
areas that cater to many different people.  Whether one is heterosexual or homosexual, born in 
the United States or an immigrant, and regardless of one’s race or gender, such a city will have a 
creative social life for each individual. 
Problems with Creative Capital 
 Many critics of Richard Florida have suggested that the concept of creative capital is 
simply elitism (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Maliszewski 2004) because the thesis behind 
Florida’s creative class is that communities need to attach highly educated people who work in 
creative jobs (i.e. white collar jobs).  Zimmerman (2008: 233) called Florida’s work a “highly 
readable exercise in yuppie self-indulgence.”  
 First, as cities develop creative centers to attract the creative class, the poor are pushed 
out to other areas of the city.  Moreover, the focus of development on the upper-middle and 
upper classes has led some to argue that the poor are completely ignored in Florida’s creative 
class thesis (Wilson and Keil 2008).  Richard Florida (2005b) responded to this criticism by 
stating that all workers are creative, and the country needs to find a way to tap all the creativity 
for all workers (Florida 2005b).  By ignoring the creativity in manufacturing and low-end service 
work, the United States is losing ground in the global marketplace to countries that have been 
able to bring creativity to other employment areas (Florida 2005b). 
 Second, critics have pointed out that Florida’s creative class is not a real social class 
(Kratke 2010).  Florida simplified class distinction into the creative class, manufacturing class, 
and the service class. However, at other times he has simply divided classes into the educated 
creative class and the uneducated class.  The concept of social class has traditionally been cloudy 
at best, with arbitrarily defined categories based on occupational groups, social status, and 
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income (Anderson 1974; Milios 2000), but Florida has muddied the waters even further (Kratke 
2010).  Florida lumped together engineers, artists, writers, politicians, professors, athletes, 
accountants, businesses owners, photographers, and any other creative worker into one single 
class.  Rutten and Gelissen (2008: 987) explained that “the only thing that these people have in 
common professionally is that they get paid to solve problems of all sorts using their creativity.”  
Florida never discussed how an accountant, professional athlete, and politician have economic 
and social interest in common.  It is assumed that all creative people will work for the betterment 
of a city, simply because they are creative.   
 Long (2009) stated that Florida’s concept of the creative class provides strategies and 
guidelines that are followed by mayors, city councils, and urban planners, and Vanolo (2008) 
wrote that these plans are inexpensive, low-risk, and modest.  However, critics have pointed out 
that the definition of creative capital is unclear.  Creativity is difficult to define and is a 
subjective concept (Boden 2004; Lewis and Donald 2010).  Who determines what is creative?  A 
writer may say his work is creative, but is that true or do other people need to acknowledge that 
his writings are creative?  Moreover, because of the ambiguous concept of creativity, many 
studies have been riddled with selective choice of data and a lack of connection to any policy 
application (Markusen 2003).  Much of the research is characterized by boosterism and mimicry 
rather than with any thoughtful planning based on social and economic welfare (Lewis and 
Donald 2010).   
 Third, some scholars have pointed out that many of the factors which Florida describes as 
part of the creative class are overwhelmingly found in large cities (Donald and Morrow 2003; 
Lewis and Donald 2010).  Small cities are left out of the creative market simply because they do 
not have the ability to attract creative jobs and immigrants as easily as larger metropolitan areas.  
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Hyndman, Schuurman and Fiedler (2006) found that immigrant concentration is related to the 
size of urban areas.  Findings such as this question the relevance of the creative capital model for 
smaller cities.  Furthermore, creative jobs are common in large cities where communication 
companies and software companies concentrate (Lewis and Donald 2010).  Small cities with 
high concentrations of people writing music, performing in a band, and doing other creative 
work outside of the defined creative class occupations that Florida has designated are not being 
included in the current measurement of creative capital (Lewis and Donald 2010).   
 Finally, Richard Florida (2002a) pointed out that cities that have the highest level of 
creative capital also have the highest income inequality.  When stating this in The Rise of the 
Creative Class Florida was less than forthcoming about this finding.  He mentioned this finding 
very briefly in an appendix (Appendix B) of the book.  In another section of the book, he stated 
“that the high-tech regions had higher incomes, more growth, more income inequality, and more 
scientists, engineers and professionals than their low-tech, but higher social capital counterparts” 
(Florida 2002a: 274).  Florida did not go on to discuss this finding, and it is curious as to why he 
mentioned income inequality along with positive outcomes.  Others have noted how deceptive 
Florida has been on this issue by stating that “Florida’s engagement with the subject is cursory; 
he simply highlights it as a danger sign of growing creative economies, noting the emergence of 
regional have and have nots – a self-perpetuating tale of two classes and two geographies” 
(Lewis and Donald 2010: 33).     
Creative Class and Social Development 
 While it may be easy for Florida to demonstrate through tables and charts that cities with 
a large amount of creative capital are economically viable, the social implications of creative 
capital remain unclear.  Florida asserts that his theory of the creative capital will make cities that 
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are high in creative capital better socially as well.  Yet, there is no evidence that supports this 
assertion.  To investigate the social implications of creative capital, the current study will 
examine three areas that might provide information about the social outcomes of creative capital 
development: crime, segregation, and educational exposure.  
Creative class centers are more likely to attract creative people to them, which in turn, 
should make cities much safer and better places to live.  These cities are better and safer because 
people in these cities have a large competitive advantage to other areas.  The schools, police 
force, and other social services will be well funded because the creative class has more income to 
be taxed.  Also, the creative classes are well educated and, thus, less likely to engage in violent 
activities. 
Florida never addressed the issue of crime in his book The Rise of the Creative Class.  He 
stated that by becoming leading creative centers, cities will be in a better position to solve any 
social problems that arise.  According to Florida, economic development leads to social 
development.  Cities that are able to attract highly educated and highly paid people to them will 
have the resources to address any social problems that arise. 
Florida never attempted to address what it means for the people already living in a city 
when the creative class moves in.  If an increase in numbers of the creative class causes rent to 
increase in the neighborhood, poorer residents will be forced to move.  This may lead to high 
levels of segregation within the city.  Yet, Florida never addressed this potential outcome.  In 
fact, Florida seemed to insinuate that the creative class will live alongside anyone, because this 
open-mindedness is what makes the creative class unique.  Florida acknowledged that the 
creative class people are isolating themselves in certain cities or “around a dozen or two mega-
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regions” (Florida 2005: 25); therefore it is not inconceivable that creative class people are 
segregating themselves within a city.   
Finally, Florida stated that once an area is creative, it is likely to increase in creativity in 
the future.  Creative class people will interact with each other as well as with noncreative people 
in the neighborhood.  This interaction will raise the intellectual level of the neighborhood, and 
soon noncreative people will be producing creative ideas.  Once again, Florida provided no 
evidence for this theory.  Readers are simply left to assume that Florida understands the behavior 
of the creative class.       
Research Purpose 
 The current study attempts to examine the movement toward creative capital in cities 
within the United States.  Cities that have been able to shift away from manufacturing to high-
end service employment – or creative employment as Florida calls it – are in a better economic 
position today.  Yet, the effect of creative capital on social outcomes for cities is unclear.   
Cities that have not transitioned from manufacturing to higher-end employment as 
smoothly as the creative cities are looking for ways to attract creative workers.  While scholars 
and researchers have continually pointed out problems with Florida’s creative capital theory 
(Brenner and Theodore 2002; Donald and Morrow 2003; Kratke 2010; Lewis and Donald 2010; 
Maliszewski 2004; Wilson and Keil 2008; Zimmerman 2008), urban planners, mayors, and city 
councils have widely accepted Florida’s model.  Cities are setting up creative marketing 
campaigns and gentrifying urban space to attract these creative workers.  Bridger and Alter 
(2006: 6) explained why cities are quick to adopt economic development over social 
development by stating: 
When leaders and citizens face a threat to the existence of their community, they are 
likely to be more concerned with maintaining a favorable business climate than with 
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issues such as social justice, equity, or environmental protection.  After all, there is 
almost certainly another community willing to offer investors a more enticing incentive 
package.   
 
Despite the scholarly criticism, Florida suggested that the movement toward creative 
capital will be a panacea for urban areas.  As evidence of this, he pointed out that creative cites 
are more open to diversity and more tolerant.  He suggested that creative cities will have higher 
economic growth as they accumulate talent and technology.  Moreover, these areas will continue 
to advance while the noncreative cities fall behind.  Florida (2008) referred to his “spiky” world 
concept as evidence of the success of the creative capital theory. He charted all of the positive 
economic and social factors on a map, and spikes in the map were associated with creative cities, 
while the areas that were not spiked were associated with the noncreative cities.  Florida (2006: 
25) stated “in order to make it in the world today, you had better get yourself onto one of those 
peaks, because the distance between the peaks and the valleys is growing wider every day.” 
Based on the previous information, the current study has the three following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: 
Suburban counties have more creative capital than urban counties. 
Hypothesis 2:   
As areas increase in creative capital, segregation within the city will increase. 
Hypothesis 3:  
As areas increase in creative capital, educational exposure will increase. 
Hypothesis 4:   
As areas increase in creative capital, crime will increase. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Industrial Revolution 
 Richard Florida (2002, 2008) has stated that the world has moved from an industrial 
economy based on manufacturing to an economy based on service.  Florida has identified two 
different types of service jobs.  There are low end service jobs, such as a cashier at a local 
grocery store or a waiter at a restaurant, which are typically low paid and do not require a lot of 
skill.  Next, there are the service workers at the high end of the socioeconomic scale.  These 
workers include professors, accountants, and engineers, and are highly paid and require a high 
level of skill (Florida 2002a).  Florida (2002a) called these high end service workers the creative 
class.  Florida did acknowledge that there are still workers in manufacturing, but he stated that 
these jobs are leaving the United States.  Moreover, these jobs are low skilled, and Florida 
lumped manufacturing work into his classification of noncreative workers. 
The next pages will provide a discussion of the shifting economy in the United States.  
While there are many factors that led to the change (Cooke 2002; Moss 1998; Rutten 2003), it is 
beyond the scope of this study to explain all the nuanced details of the change.  Scholars have 
acknowledged that a shift has occurred (Cooke 2002; Rutten 2003), and the present study 
examines what this change means to urban areas based on Richard Florida’s creative class 
model.  
The Industrial Revolution ushered in a new form of work around the world.  The change 
to manufacturing happened slowly, with small merchants adopting small-scale production to 
their crafts (Vallas, Finlay, and Wharton 2009).  Prior to the Industrial Revolution, craftsmen 
were constrained by the availability of resources around the workplace, which inhibited 
economic production (Goldstone 2002).  With the advent of manufacturing, many technologies 
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began to increase production.  For instance, the steam engine, invented by James Watt, came on 
line in the late 1780s and was quickly used for cotton spinning, iron smelting, grain milling, 
brick making, and for transport in locomotives and sea-faring vessels (Vallas, Finlay, and 
Wharton 2009).  Moss (1998: 107) explained “during the 19th century, industrialization gave rise 
to manufacturing plants and factory towns, while the steam engine led to the growth of seaport 
cities and a system of railroads that linked cities and towns across North America.”   
 As the new technologies made manufacturing more efficient, the world saw a change in 
the workplace from small craftsmen to large industrial manufacturing.  The commercial 
landowners, craftsmen, financiers, and merchants developed into the commercial class, which 
began to accumulate wealth and power within cities in the industrial era (Vallas, Finlay, and 
Wharton 2009).  The change to manufacturing had a large effect on cities around the world.   
 While wealth was accumulating in the hands of the commercial class, a new class of 
wage laborers emerged.  Wage laborers had “no hope of attaining the status of either master 
craftsman (which implied ownership of one’s own shop) or even journeyman (which did not), 
factory workers grew in number – and, many argued shame and degradation” (Vallas, Finlay, 
and Wharton 2009: 71).  As manufacturing took root in England many began to see the impact 
that industrialization was having on the wage laborers.  Engels wrote the classic The Condition of 
the Working Class in England (1993 [1845]) in which he described the horrendous conditions 
and squalor that workers experienced.  There was widespread use of child labor, a lengthening of 
the workday, wages which were barely enough for survival, and many other social ills produced 
by this new kind of work. 
 The rise of the Industrial Revolution occurred for many different reasons, and new 
technologies undoubtedly had a large effect (Moss 1998).  The steam engine, discussed above, is 
24 
 
 
 
just one example of a new technology replacing an older, more inefficient form of work.  
Although a variety of factors can be named as reasons for this change, the fact is that a change in 
the workplace has occurred (Cooke 2002; Moss 1998; Rutten 2003; Vallas, Finlay, and Wharton 
2009).  Many people were displaced as their jobs became obsolete.  Others found new 
employment opportunities.  The commercial classes developed as the dominant class, and the 
wage laborers became the working class.  
Wal-Mart and Today’s Working Conditions 
     Wal-Mart – the largest retailer in the United States – many not be thought of as the same 
as the large industrial plants of the 1800s, but Wal-Mart is an example of work in the United 
States today.  The service industry has changed work in the United States.  As manufacturing 
plants leave, cities are left adjusting to a new form of work.  This new form of work had had a 
similar effect as the adjustment cities had to make when the economy shifted from agricultural 
production to manufacturing.   
 The new form of work can be best explained by the example of Wal-Mart and Sam 
Walton, who portrayed himself as a folksy embodiment of the American Dream.  Walton 
instilled team work and company pride in his workers.  The hard work would increase the profits 
of the company, and all the workers would benefit from the success of the company.  However, 
for all the success of Wal-Mart, not all the employees have experienced the same success as Sam 
Walton.  Mander and Boston (1996: 339) stated “most ‘associates,’ as the company calls its 
employees, are given only part-time work so that the company can avoid paying the benefits full-
time workers must receive.”  Full-time workers do not seem fare much better, as Mander and 
Boston (1996: 339) continued “the average annual income for a full-time worker at Wal-Mart in 
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the United States, even with a well-publicized profit-sharing plan, hovers around $12,000 – well 
below the poverty line.”      
 The effect of the service economy on communities has been great.  Mander and Boston 
(1996: 337) pointed out that “Wal-Mart leads to a net loss of jobs, decreased income for the 
community, and a decline of the central shopping areas.”  It is not just communities in the United 
States that have experienced negative outcomes associated with Wal-Mart.  Mander and Boston 
(1996: 336): 
Shrewd manufacturing, mass purchasing, and an automated inventory and distribution 
system that eliminates the middle man made Wal-Mart a dominant force in North 
America and will help Wal-Mart achieve its global dreams.  The result may be that the 
small, diverse, family-run neighborhood stores, which are the economic and cultural 
backbone of communities throughout Asia, Europe, and South America, will soon give 
way to the mighty, homogenizing global retailer.    
  
 Exploring the effect of Wal-Mart stores in communities, Goetz and Swaminathan (2006) 
examined the locational impact of stores opening in counties.  The study found that “the presence 
of Wal-Mart was unequivocally associated with smaller reductions in family-poverty rates in 
U.S. counties during the 1990s relative to places that had no stores” (Goetz and Swaminathan 
2006: 223).  This suggests that the new service economy not only hurts individual workers, but 
can have a negative impact on communities as well.     
Wal-Mart is just one example that is representative of today’s workplace.  Many other 
large retailers are guilty of the same practices.  What the example of Wal-Mart does show is how 
the workplace has changed today.  No longer do social scientists describe the awful working 
conditions found in manufacturing plants.  Instead, the shift from manufacturing to service work 
has had the same effects on people and communities as the Industrial Revolution, which will be 
discussed next.   
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The Changing Workplace 
     The shift from manufacturing work to service work in the United States has had a 
profound impact on how communities function (Cappellin 2007; Powell and Snellman 2004; 
Schlichtman 2009).  Globalization has allowed many manufacturing companies to send work to 
other countries, where lower wages can be paid.  Communities all across the United States have 
been affected by this movement.  Service work, such as the jobs provided at Wal-Mart, have 
replaced the manufacturing jobs in the United States. 
Vallas, Finlay, and Wharton (2009: 181) described service work as “among the lowest 
paid in the labor force.”  Vallas, Finlay, and Wharton (2009: 181) continued “low wages and, in 
some cases, lack of opportunity for full-time work combine to keep these workers’ earnings at or 
below the poverty level.”  Richard Florida (2002; 2008) pointed out this change by stating that 
there are two different groups of workers in the United States:  those who are employed in 
creative jobs and those workers employed in service work.  Florida maintains that cities need to 
attract the creative class to them.  If cities cannot attract the creative workers, the city will be left 
with poorly paid service work, which will not help the city develop economically.   
Former United States Secretary of Labor Robert Reich (1991; 2002; 2008) studied the 
impact that globalization had on employment in the U.S, and he stated that there are only three 
types of jobs in the United States today:  routine production services, in-person services, and 
symbolic-analytic services.  Routine production services refer to jobs which require repetitive 
tasks, such as manufacturing.  According to Reich, these jobs are being moved to other countries 
at a rapid pace.  People in the United States and other industrialized nations can no longer count 
on large segments of their population working in manufacturing.  In the 1990s, routine 
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production services accounted for about 25 percent of all jobs, but Reich stated that this 
percentage is expected to continue to decline. 
In-person service jobs are replacing routine production services jobs.  Food preparation 
workers, daycare workers, bus drivers, elder care employees, and hair stylists are all examples of 
in-person service jobs.  These jobs will never be exported to other countries because they require 
that a person be present to complete the service.  According to Reich, in the 1990s in-person 
service jobs accounted for about 30 percent of all employment, and this percentage was expected 
to increase, as workers who get laid off from routine production services enter this sector.  
However, these jobs are decreasing in pay, as more people flock to this type of work.  
Companies such as Wal-Mart provide the bulk of in-person service work.   
Finally, Reich described symbolic-analytic service jobs, which are what Richard Florida 
refers to as creative class jobs.  Reich stated that scientists, engineers, writers, attorneys, and 
management consultants are example of symbolic-analytic service jobs.  Symbolic-analytic 
service jobs are increasing in the United States.  Highly educated people work in this sector, 
which is based around knowledge, problem solving, and strategic thinking.  In the 1950s, 
symbolic-analytic service jobs accounted for less than 10 percent of the employment in the 
United States.  According to Reich, by the 1990s, symbolic-analytic service jobs increased to 
around 20 percent.  Significantly, the wages of the workers in symbolic-analytic service jobs 
have also increased.  As Florida has pointed out, the skills and knowledge of the creative class, 
or symbolic-analytic service workers, are in high demand for employers.  O’Toole and Lawler III 
(2006: 4) explained the implications of this increase in wage inequality by stating that “the 
average CEO in a Fortune 500 company takes home over 400 times the pay of the average 
employee (in 1973 the ratio was 40 to 1).”  Describing the gulf that has developed between the 
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creative and service worker in the United States, O’Toole and Lawler III (2006: 4-5) stated “a 
seventy-year old “retired” American accountant starts a new career as a financial consultant to a 
small, start-up business in Asia.  He is “greeted” at Wal-Mart by a part-time employee his age 
who is still working because she doesn’t have sufficient savings to retire.” 
O’Toole and Lawler III described three types of companies which indicate that 
companies have adapted to the new American economy. These three types of companies are  
low-cost operators, global competitor corporations, and high-involvement companies.  Low-cost 
operators are large grocery, fast-food, and discount stores.  These stores are often referred to as 
big box stores, such as Wal-Mart, Target, and Best Buy.  Low-cost operators have developed a 
model to continuously reduce the cost of operation, whether it be reducing wages to employees 
or closing unprofitable stores.  The discussion of Wal-Mart above is an example of how low-cost 
operators try to reduce costs.  Hiring employees as part-time employees reduces the cost to Wal-
Mart because the retailer does not have to provide benefits.  However, such cost-saving 
techniques can have enormous impacts on people and communities:  
Because there is little opportunity for workers who are at the bottom in LC companies to 
make a good living or to do interesting work – much less to make a career – these jobs 
mainly attract employees who cannot find other jobs; retirees, young workers and 
students (particularly those living with their parents and covered by their health 
insurance), less-educated workers with fewer options, immigrants with limited English-
language skills, and those who are unable or unwilling to take jobs requiring more 
responsibility. (O’Toole and Lawler III 2006: 11).  
 
Global competitor corporations are large international corporations.  These companies 
employ workers in pharmaceuticals, biomedicine, finances, telecommunications, and other 
industries.  There is little or no stability in employment for people in global competitor 
corporations.  Often employees are employed on a contingent basis while lower-level workers 
watch their jobs move to other countries.  The management positions are highly paid, but the 
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main goal of a global competitor corporation is to make a quick profit.  Thus, if Mexico offers 
lower wages, then companies will move plants from the United States to Mexico.  If wages rise 
in Mexico global competitor corporations would then look for another country that offers lower 
wages. 
High-involvement companies offer workers a large amount of input in the management 
of the company.  These companies experience low worker turnover and rarely lay off workers.  
These companies promote mainly from within, and there is a clear sense of company pride.  
Companies like Google, Facebook, and Yahoo are examples of high-involvement companies.  
These companies often offer daycares, schools, employee housing, and other amenities aimed at 
making the employees happy.  These amenities also allow many of these companies to pay less 
than some of their competitors as employees weigh the cost of daycare, schooling, and other 
social services to an increased salary at another company.  The amenities offered at high-
involvement companies are similar to the amenities, or soft factors as Martin-Brelot et al. (2010) 
described, that cities are offering to attract the creative class to them.  
Global competitor corporations and high-involvement companies are the jobs of the 
creative classes. Global competitor corporations often pay high wages to consultants and other 
creative workers.  They are “constantly searching for talent – for individuals with the skills 
needed for today’s challenges – and pay top dollar to get them” (O’Toole and Lawler III 2006: 
13).  High-involvement companies may not pay as much as global competitor corporations, but 
they are still high-paying jobs.  The employees take slightly less pay for more stability.   
Conley (2009) described how these workers are no longer simply company men or the 
organizational man described by Whyte (1956).  Company men took a job at a company and 
remained there until retirement.  The company men went to work and then came home to their 
30 
 
 
 
families.  However, today’s worker will likely change jobs many times, as is the case for workers 
in global competitor corporations.  Workers today view themselves as free agents looking for the 
best deal.  This observation was backed up by Hoyman and Faricy (2009: 314), who stated that 
“modern workers have much different utility functions” than workers in the industrial past.  
Therefore, some creative workers are comfortable being contingent workers for global 
competitor corporations, while other creative workers are more comfortable in high-involvement 
companies.   
Moreover, according to Conley (2009) employees no longer work on fixed schedules as 
did the company men of the past.  The invention of email, Blackberries, and the Internet have 
allowed employees to work virtually anywhere at any time.  For instance, a consultant at a global 
competitor corporation can work on a project at 2 a.m. or 4 p.m.  The employee of today works 
whenever his or her creativity is at its height.  The same is true for workers in high-involvement 
companies because daycares, schools, hair stylists, and the other amenities are aimed at keeping 
the worker happy so that the creativity can be maximized.  Creative workers can work from 
home, a coffee shop, or the office.  The key to making creative workers happy is providing 
options.   
This new work in the United States has benefitted the creative class.  Workers at global 
competitor corporations and high-involvement companies can work anytime and anywhere most 
of the time.  However, this work does have some drawbacks. For example, this type of work 
sometimes results in a blurring of the line between work and family.  Moreover, employees in 
low-cost operators still work on set schedules and receive low pay for their work. 
When Florida discussed what cities can do to attract the creative class, he has suggested 
that cities need to attract high-involvement companies and global competitor corporations 
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because these types of corporations and companies provide jobs to the creative class.  An 
example of attracting the creative class can be found in Charlotte, North Carolina. Charlotte has 
been able to develop a creative class by attracting global competitor corporations and high 
involvement companies:   
Charlotte, North Carolina, the third-largest banking canter in the United States (after New 
York and San Francisco), is an example of a city that has thrived as its major commercial 
banks have expanded their operations and geographic scope of activities.  Charlotte is 
thriving precisely because the technological innovations have expanded the geographic 
reach and role of interstate banking.  (Moss 1998: 122) 
 
Moss (1998) went on to explain that cities like Austin, New York, Seattle, and San Francisco 
have done a great job embracing technology and the Internet.  Moss (1998) and Florida (2002a) 
have pointed out that these cities are growing and striving for.  On the other hand, cities like 
Detroit, Houston, Miami, and New Orleans have not moved to the new technology- and 
computer-driven economy, and have been classified as stagnant and dying.  In this new 
economy, cities that do not  attract the global competitor corporations and high-involvement 
companies will not attract the creative class. 
However, as Reich pointed out, in-person service jobs are increasing.  As cities 
experience an increase in jobs in global competitor corporations and high-involvement 
companies (symbolic-analytic services), low-cost operators (in-person services) follow to take 
care of the service needs of the creative class.  When Richard Florida (2002: 354) stated “there is 
a strong correlation between inequality and creativity:  the more creative a region is, the more 
inequality you will find there” he was describing how noncreative workers are needed to take 
care of the creative class. 
Examining the impact of the noncreative workers in Spain, Bernardi and Garrido (2008: 
310) pointed out that “unskilled service workers’ share of employment is currently 14 per cent.”  
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The authors argued that this had led to a new class of workers in Spain.  A similar phenomenon 
is likely to occur in cities that follow the creative class model.  Moving toward the creative class 
model will lead to increased income inequality because the need for in-service (noncreative) 
workers increases.  The increase in income inequality can result in negative social consequences, 
such as segregation and crime. 
The Rooted and the Mobile 
 With the rise of the new creative economy, people choose where to live, (Florida 2002; 
2005a. 2005b, 2006, 2008, 2010) rather than simply moving to a neighborhood, planting roots, 
and staying there, as was often the case in the past.  Today people are highly mobile and to 
“create a growth region, you need the kind of place that people want to come to and can easily 
get to, where they can lead the lives they want and express themselves freely” (Florida 2006: 26).   
This increased mobility leads to an increase in isolation as many mobile people do not 
know how to meet new people.  As Florida (2008: 169) stated “it’s ironic that a by-product of a 
globalized world is increased isolation.”  The change to the creative economy has changed the 
way in which people are connected to their communities.  According to Florida, there are 
currently two types of people:  the rooted and the mobile.  Rooted people do not move far from 
where they grew up and are less educated; less motivated, and will make less money than the 
mobile.  As Florida (2008: 85) stated “many of the rooted have relatively little education or 
money and relatively low professional aspirations or personal expectations.”  
Rooted people often must settle for the jobs that are available in the city in which they 
live.  Therefore, if a city’s economy is based on manufacturing, these are the types of  jobs the 
rooted will have to take.  Moreover, the rooted might not have aspirations of moving to a 
different city because the rooted have everything they want in their current neighborhood.  On 
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the other hand, the mobile determine where they would like to live.  If a city has excellent 
employment opportunities, then the mobile will move to that city. However, the mobile do not 
base their decisions on where to live simply on the jobs available in a city.       
Many factors influence where the mobile choose to live.  Florida pointed out that moving 
to a city for a job might not be as important as other factors to the mobile.  As Florida (2008: 84) 
suggested:   
This common pattern suggests three important things.  First, people tend to orient their 
job searches around particular places.  Second, where one’s friends reside also matters.  
Third, and arguably most telling, we wouldn’t move just anywhere for a job. 
 
The city must present the mobile with creative structures that will lure the mobile to the city.  
Florida (2008: 84) pointed out that “a 2002 survey by Next Generation Consulting found that 
three-quarters of recent college graduates choose where to live, then look for a job in that 
market.”   
 The mobile have a large impact on communities.  Florida argued that cities must attract 
the creative class (the mobile) to their cities.  To do this, communities must provide creative 
jobs, attractions, and a night life that will make it a destination for the mobile.  Cities like Austin, 
San Francisco, and Washington D.C. have been able to attract the mobile to them, while cities 
like Buffalo, Detroit, and Cleveland have not been able to become creative centers which attract 
the mobile.  This is also why cities like Milwaukee and Austin have implemented strategies to 
lure the creative class (the mobile) to them (Long 2009; Zimmerman 2008).  
 While Florida may be correct in his analysis of what makes a city creative and how the 
mobile will choose to live in a creative community, it is unclear what this means in terms of 
social benefits to the city.  Moore and Daday (2010) demonstrated that while Cameroon, Kenya, 
and Swaziland took steps to increase the human capital, ultimately these steps failed.  This 
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failure was due to the countries having structural problems that denied human capital 
development.  If cities in the United States attempt to cater to the creative class without the 
necessary structure in place, what will happen is unclear; or, as in the case of Milwaukee, the 
outcome may be negative (Zimmerman 2008), because the social problems of the city were not 
solved by the movement to the creative class.   
 The lack of knowledge of the consequences of increasing the creative capital in a city is a 
large omission for city leaders who are following Florida’s creative class concept.  However, 
Florida’s model continues to be used by city planners even with these omissions.  Florida (2008: 
130) explained “I know Memphis well – we hosted the Memphis Manifesto Summit there, a 
major national conference devoted to rebuilding cities along creative lines.  I’ve worked with 
community leaders in Cincinnati, Cleveland, Louisville, Lexington, Tulsa, and Oklahoma City, 
and am impressed with all of those cities too.” As Florida (2008: 213) explained “regional 
leaders must become more aware of how their region’s collective personality shapes the kinds of 
economic activities that it can do and the kinds of people it can attract, satisfy, and retain.”   
In The Rise of the Creative Class Florida ranked Memphis 132, Cincinnati 68, Cleveland 
118, Louisville 171, Lexington 50, Tulsa 154, and Oklahoma City 93 on his Creative Index 
measure.  The higher the number on the index, the less creative is the city.  Hence, these cities 
that are working with Florida to try to become creative are the cities in the poorest position to 
become creative (Bontje and Musterd 2009).  It is apparent that cities are listening to Florida’s 
call to become more creative.  Because Memphis invited Florida to their city to speak about 
creative opportunities, it is important that city leads and policy makers in Memphis understand 
the outcomes that implementing plans to bring in the creative class might have for the social 
development of the city.  Florida (2002: 354) stated “there is a strong correlation between 
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inequality and creativity:  the more creative a region is, the more inequality you will find there.”  
In another book, Florida (2008: 211) stated “the very strengths that make places diverse and 
creative seem to damage our social capital and community commitment.”  “It may very well be 
that creative cities have higher concentrations of people whose basic personality makeup is doing 
their own thing” (Florida 2008: 210).  If city leaders were made aware of this acknowledgement, 
it might offer pause to cities that are trying to increase their creativity.  However, the increase in 
income inequality is not discussed in examinations of how to attract the creative class to a 
community.   
Table 1:  The Top Ten and Bottom Ten Creative Cities 
Top Ten Creative Cities in the United States 
 Creativity Rank Creativity Index Score 
Austin, TX 1 0.963 
San Francisco, CA 2 0.958 
Seattle, WA 3 0.955 
Burlington, VT 4 0.942 
Boston, MA 5 0.934 
Raleigh-Durham, NC 6 0.932 
Portland, OR 7 0.926 
Madison, WI 8 0.918 
Boise City, ID 9 0.914 
Minneapolis, MN 10 0.900 
Bottom Ten Creative Cities in the United States 
Mansfield, OH 267 0.147 
Victoria, TX 268 0.145 
Sheboygan, WI 269 0.144 
Danville, VA 270 0.138 
Houma, LA 271 0.135 
Youngstown, OH 272 0.130 
Lima, OH 273 0.128 
Sumter, SC 274 0.116 
Joplin, MO 275 0.095 
Gadsden, AL 276 0.058 
*The list is based on the data from The Rise of the Creative Class (2002) by Richard Florida   
Florida and Tinagli (2004) argued that technology and talent are highly mobile 
commodities that cities could use to attract the creative class.  Cities could offer the creative 
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class soft amenities (i.e., a great housing market or a fun cultural scene) that would attract 
creative class individuals (Musterd, Bontje, Chapain, Kovacs, and Murie 2007).  However, 
Florida may be incorrect regarding the mobility of the creative class.  Examining the movements 
of the creative class in a sample of European cities, Martin-Berlot et al. (2010: 859) found that 
“the majority of respondents had been living and studying in the city before they started their 
professional careers.”  “The overwhelming majority of respondents simply stayed in the city 
where they were born or graduated” (Martin-Berlot et al. 2010: 860).  In that study, it was found 
that most creative class individuals lived in cities where they grew up and chose to live in that 
city not based on amenities like bike paths and coffee house (as Florida has suggested), but based 
on family and friends living in the city. 
  Changing the City Environment 
By following Florida’s model, cities are determining the outcomes of their cities.  The 
consequences of choosing Florida’s path can mean the difference between a thriving community 
and a decaying one.  If creative capital is the wrong path, cities could be dooming their residents 
to failure because of lack of job opportunities. 
Florida is not the first person to point out that culture has a large impact on urban and 
regional spaces (Ponzini and Rossi 2010).  Storm (2004) examined the representations of the 
cultural as an ensemble of cultural and artistic activities taking place at the city and 
neighborhood levels.  Scott (1998) and Landry (2000) both explained that an urban renaissance 
would come about by the economic and social externalities generated by the local artistic and 
creative activities of the city.  Scott (2000) continued this line of thinking by explaining that 
certain cities and countries are engaged in cultural economies where cultural-product industries 
are exporting culture to other areas. 
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Rutten and Gelissen (2008: 986) argued that Florida’s theory can “be seen as an 
elaboration of the milieu of innovation literature.”  Innovation is the result of making 
improvements on an old idea or developing a new form of knowledge (Lee, Florida, and Acs 
2004; Thanawala 1995).  Innovative environments foster development by bringing together 
entrepreneurs and creative people to interact (Oerlemans, Meeus, and Kenis 2007).  This 
innovation leads to competiveness, which has been found to lead to economic development (Best 
2001; Porter 1990).    
Before the emergence of the creative capital concept, Moss (1998: 107) stated: 
Today, new and emerging telecommunications technologies are transforming the 
economic role of cities and their pattern of physical development.  Many cities have lost 
their roles as corporate headquarters and manufacturing centers, while others have 
attracted information-intensive activities, such as bank offices, customer service centers, 
and research and development laboratories.  
 
Darchen and Tremblay (2010: 227) pointed out that “certain professional occupations have more 
impact on regional development than others, for example education and healthcare have little 
effect, compared with occupations like computer science, engineering, management and business 
operations.”  Sassen (2009a: 8) argued that cities in today’s global economy are specializing in a 
particular area and stated that “firms thrive of the specialized differences of cities, and it is this 
that gives a city its particular advantage in the global economy.” 
 This is the argument that Richard Florida puts forth as to why certain urban areas are 
thriving while other areas are declining.  Creative cities have been able to attract the occupations 
that foster economic development.  Long (2009: 210-211) explained that “given the apparent 
disconnect between academic opinion and popular support, it is evident that extensive empirical 
scholarship is needed to better comprehend the effect of the “creative city” phenomenon.”     
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Richard Florida (2008: 247) hinted at some of the problems with moving to a creative 
capital society by stating “what we are witnessing, for better or for worse, is the growing 
stratification of communities, countries, and the world at large,” and continued “for every young 
person who moves into an urban mosaic or hipster haven, it is likely that a lower-income family, 
or part of that family, has been driven out.”  The process of changing communities can have 
negative consequences for the people living in the community.  In Naked City, Sharon Zukin 
(2010) described the process of high-income people displacing low-income residents by 
explaining what happened when the creative classes moved into areas once thought to be poverty 
stricken and crime ridden. 
Harlem was once the center of African American culture, with a rich history of music, 
people, and community (Zukin 2010).  Harlem has also been viewed as a ghetto by outsiders, 
because the area has experienced high poverty and crime rates.  Yet Zukin (2010) argued that 
Harlem is no longer a ghetto and is becoming a middle class neighborhood.  Zukin (2010: 69-70) 
stated:  
If for many years Harlem embodied the dual racial consciousness of African Americans 
that W. E. B. Du Bois described at the turn of the twentieth century, today it represents 
what Henry Louis Gates Jr. calls blacks’ social class hyphenation.  On one side, you have 
new high-rise office and residential towers, million-dollar brownstone townhouses, and 
rosemary focaccia: the cultural signs of the “new Harlem Renaissance.”  On the other 
side, you have old high-rise public housing projects, social service agencies, and 
“chicken shacks”:  the dark ghetto’s terroir.       
 
As the community becomes more middle class and more million-dollar brownstone townhouses 
are built, the older residents are displaced.  Over time, the area begins to resemble every other 
middle class community (Zukin 2010).   
 A similar process took place in the neighborhood of Soho in New York City.  Zukin 
(2010) pointed out that Soho used to be gritty, and a place for alternative culture.  However, 
39 
 
 
 
today Soho is known for shopping, with stores such as the Banana Republic and Louis Vuitton 
replacing the older, authentic places.  As neighborhoods change, new social problems will arise.  
For Zukin (2010), the loss of authentic places is of foremost concern, but what Zukin (2010) and 
Florida have not addressed is what the change means for the city, the residents of the city, and 
for crime within the city.   
The transition of Soho and Harlem to middle class communities is not necessarily a bad 
outcome.  Many of the residents may be able to stay in the community and benefit from 
increased employment opportunities. Moreover, the increased tax base could go toward 
improving schools, police forces, and other infrastructure.  However, we do need to know if the 
changes are having an adverse impact on other communities.  As people move from Harlem to 
other areas, crime, poverty, and unemployment may rise in these other areas of New York City.  
Understanding this change can inform city officials about the new areas where they might need 
to move social services and other programs.     
Similar arguments have been made by scholars about the movement to the creative 
economy and creative capital.  Sassen (2009b: 59) pointed out that: 
The growth of a high-income professional class and high-profit corporate service firms 
becomes legible in urban space through the growing demand for state-of-the-art office 
buildings and all the key components of the residential sphere and consumption.  This 
growing demand leads to often massive and visible displacements of more modest-
income households and modest-profit-making firms, no matter how healthy these may be 
from the perspective of the economy and market demand.  In this process, urban space 
itself reproduces economic and racial inequality.  
 
Cities that are focusing on creative development are displacing middle and lower-class residents 
(Bradford 2004; Gertler 2004; Scott 2006).  Hyndman et al. (2006) demonstrated that cities in 
Canada which followed the creative economic development model also ranked the highest in 
socioeconomic inequality.  
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Bontje and Musterd (2009) have pointed out that cities that are in the poorest position to 
move toward a creative capital model are typically the ones that try to do so.  For example, 
Memphis is the home of Federal Express, which is a “$33 billion company serving 220 
companies and handling more than 7.5 million shipments daily” (Katz 2010: 71).  Federal 
Express is a major corporation and employs numerous residents in Memphis.  However, Federal 
Express does not provide creative work for its employees.  There may be a number of positions 
for managers and engineers within the company, but the company mainly provides work based 
around service, with employees working in call centers, handling packages, and placing the 
packages on airplanes.  If Memphis were to move to a more creative economy, Federal Express 
might not be in the long-term plans of the city.  If Federal Express left Memphis, many people 
would be suffer from the increased unemployment and poverty.  At the same time, it is not 
certain that creative companies like Google, Facebook, or Yahoo would be interested in opening 
locations in Memphis.  The move to the creative economy may be easier for some cities but 
might not be a real option for others. 
Moreover, although Memphis may have universities located within the city, the lack of 
creative employment opportunities likely means that many of the workers will move to other 
cities after graduation.  Florida ranked Memphis 132 in The Rise of the Creative Class because 
of these factors, while nearby Nashville (42), St. Louis (68), Lexington (50), and Knoxville (80) 
were ranked higher.  These cities could potentially rob Memphis of the people who are in the 
creative class. 
When explaining how Milwaukee followed the creative capital model, Zimmerman 
(2008) described that the outcome was not positive for the city.  Milwaukee had a net job loss 
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when the city moved to a creative capital model, with unemployment rates highest among 
minorities (Zimmerman 2008).  Zimmerman (2008: 241) explained the outcome by stating: 
The marriage of Florida’s ideas with municipal action in Milwaukee did support a 
celebrated resurgence in the comparatively tiny downtown area, but it did nothing to 
forestall the economic disintegration of the remainder of the city.  It therefore ultimately 
brought into even sharper relief what was already one of the most economically and 
racially polarized cities in the United States.          
 
 Long (2009) pointed out that even the widely celebrated creative city of Austin could 
experience negative outcomes from following the creative capital model.  Long (2009) asserted 
that the influx of the creative class has led to the loss of Austin’s soul.  As creative people moved 
to Austin, the city became a wealthy paradise; however, many of the long-term residents saw 
Austin as being overly commercialized.  Residents stated that Austin lost its uniqueness and is 
now homogenized (Long 2009), which is the same process that Zukin (2010) described in 
Harlem and Soho.   
Bringing in creative industries and becoming a creative city cannot happen out of thin air 
(Hall 2004).  There are a large number of factors that lead to certain industries being in certain 
regions and cities.  Innovation cannot be spurred simply by local conditions but is more 
dependent on local assets that are connected to the global economy (Simmie 2005; Stroper and 
Venables 2004).    
Individualism and Social Capital 
    America has become more individualistic (Florida 2002a; Twenge 2006), and has 
experienced a loss of social capital (Besser 2009; Putnam 2000).  The individualistic ethos of 
today’s society has major implications for communities and has been linked to the high crime 
rate in the United States as compared to other countries (Braithwaite 1989).  As Florida (2008: 
210) stated “it may very well be that creative cities have higher concentrations of people whose 
42 
 
 
 
basic personality makeup is doing their own thing.”  Even if the creative class interacts with each 
other for ideas, it is not clear that creative class individuals interact as much as Florida has 
suggested.  Moreover, if those in the creative class segregate themselves from the noncreative 
class, this would negate the benefits of the educational exposure that Florida has presented as a 
major benefit of the creative class model.    
Individuality is championed in many different ways in the United States.  For example, 
the United States Army changed its slogan in 2001 to “An Army of One” (Twenge 2006).  “Get 
a Piece of the Rock” was changed to “Be Your Own Rock” by Prudential (Twenge 2006).  In 
2004, Brittney Spears was asked what her priorities in life were and she stated “Myself, my 
husband, and starting a family” (Twenge 2006: 51).  Notice the very individualistic trait of 
listing herself first. 
 According to Twenge (2006), the change from a collective society to an individualistic 
society began around 1975.  Twenge argued that as the baby boom generation had children, they 
taught them to identify with individualistic traits.  “Generation Me” has become the most 
individualistic generation in history.       
 This shift to a more individualistic society has had a profound impact on communities 
and the United States.  Twenge (2006) pointed out that there are some negative aspects to this 
shift.  One negative is that “Generation Me” does not value social relationships.  Young adults 
are more likely to email, text, or post a message on Facebook rather than actually interacting face 
to face.  While many young adults may have a large network of “friends” on Facebook, these 
likely do not represent true friendships.  Twenge (2006: 238) stated: 
You will be much happier if you make the extra effort needed to see friends and family.  
E-mail and the phone are great, but person-to-person contact is better.  It goes against our 
instincts, but we should try to make those little social gestures that came so naturally to 
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previous generations:  welcoming a new neighbor, having friends over for dinner, joining 
a club.     
  
Twenge (2006) went on to explain that Generation Me also does not participate in 
community affairs.  Generation Me has an outlook on life that nothing can be changed and that 
outcomes have much more to do with a given situation than hard work.  Thus, young adults think 
question the point to trying to change a situation because it is fate, and one cannot change fate.  
Young people do not vote in high rates because of the idea that they cannot change anything.  
Twenge (2006: 157) wrote:  
The consequences for society as a whole are alarming.  If everyone believes that nothing 
can be changed, that prophecy is likely to be self-fulfilling.  And if we blame others for 
our problems, we might never make the changes we need to improve as a people. 
 
The move toward a more individualistic society may be associated with a number of 
social ills for cities.  Neighborhoods that are characterized by social networks and social capital 
have more charitable contributions (Leonard, Croson, and Oliveira 2010), which indicates how 
important social interactions are to communities.  Individuals in neighborhoods where people did 
not join groups and clubs were less likely to give to charities that would aid in fixing the 
neighborhood’s social ills.   
Furthermore, neighborhoods with less social networks had less trust in their neighbors 
(Leonard et al. 2010; Uslaner 2010).  Neighborhoods with diverse social networks which crossed 
racial and economic social lines experienced higher levels of trust in neighbors (Uslaner 2010).  
Segregation might have the worst effects on trust in a neighborhood (Uslaner 2010) and may 
increase the rate of crime found in the neighborhood (Ousey and Lee 2010).  According to Ousey 
and Lee (2010), communities with high civic involvement have lower crime rates. They also 
found that racial disparities in arrests lessen when the community has high social capital.  
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Therefore, any model of development which might increase individualism and segregation may 
increase social problems in the city. 
The creative class model is based on individualism.  Cities are supposed to attract the 
creative class by offering trendy coffee shops, night clubs, restaurants, and other amenities.  
There is no sense of community in this form of development.  Instead, the creative class 
individuals are being courted by cities with the express idea of being as individualistic as 
possible.  When describing the attraction of Austin for the creative class, Long (2009) stated that 
it was the uniqueness of the city and the ability for people to be themselves.  However, after the 
influx of the creative class, residents said that Austin is no longer cool, but instead is 
homogenized like every other city (Long 2009).      
The movement from the young individualistic Generation Me to the upper class of the 
United States was best described by David Brooks, who Florida acknowledges as one of his 
influences in creating the creative class model.  Brooks (2000) demonstrated how young creative 
people now dominate the upper classes of society and are now pushing their agendas.  The 
Bourgeois Bohemians or “Bobos,” as Brooks calls the new upper class, are different than those 
in previous generations.   
 In the 1960s and 1970s, young adults attending colleges and universities across the 
United States experienced protest over racial issues, gender issues, and the Vietnam War.  As a 
result of this social environment, many of the students took on bohemian identities.  As time 
passed, the bohemians from the protests of the 1960s and 1970s became the bourgeois group as 
they entered corporate America.  However, the bohemians held on to their alternative and 
individualistic roots, which created Bobos. 
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 Currently, there are many examples of Bobos running corporations.  No longer do 
workers wear a suit and a tie to work.  Instead, dress is casual and part of a person’s self-
expression while at work.  Companies allow their workers to bring dogs to work, offices are 
replaced with open spaces, and people can ride a scooter around the office floor.  This bohemian 
influx into work is what Florida describes as creative.  Creative people want to express 
themselves individually. 
 Bobos have brought many changes to communities Bobos have held on to their bohemian 
identity and still desire to live in the trendy areas of the city.  It is the Bobos who Zukin (2010) 
described as moving into Harlem and Soho, and who Long (2009) explained moved to Austin.  
The Bobos wanted to live in the gritty, cool areas of the community because that is how they 
view themselves.  However, the Bobos are not the alternative group anymore.  They are the 
upper class (creative class) in the United States.  When the Bobos move to poor communities 
because of the authenticity of such communities, the poor will eventually be driven out of that 
community because of rising housing prices.  Eventually, the neighborhood begins to resemble 
an upper class community with high end businesses.          
The Bobos are the creative class that Florida covets as the basis for community 
development.  Unfortunately, the Bobos are individualistic, and this has negative implications for 
neighborhoods (Leonard et al. 2010; Ousey and Lee 2010; Uslaner 2010).  As the Bobos, or 
creative class, search for the gritty authentic community, they often destroy what it is they like 
about the community.   
Educational Exposure 
 With the possibility of more segregation and individualism in the creative class model, 
Florida has argued that the exposure the creative class provides for the city outweighs these 
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negative aspects of the model.  He has asserted that when the creative class moves into a city, 
there will be knowledge spillovers.  The ideas and knowledge of the creative class is passed on to 
the noncreative class (Stolarick and Florida 2006).  The knowledge spillover, in turn, leads to 
innovation and creates new ideas as artists, students, and other creative class individuals work 
together (Landry 2000).  New firm creations and the share of high technology employment 
within a city lend support to the exposure effect (Florida 2002b; Lee, Florida, and Acs 2004).   
Cities that have attracted the creative class have seen a larger increase in economic 
growth from 1990 to 2000 (Wojan, Lambert, and McGranahan 2007).  Schlichtman (2009) 
illustrated how a city could become a “niche” city based around creative capital.  By becoming a 
niche city, High Point, North Carolina was able to grow in the global marketplace.  Cities, such 
as Flint, Michigan, were not able to change and attract creative capital; thus, Flint declined in the 
global marketplace.       
 To Florida, the exposure of the creative class far outweighs any negative aspects of the 
creative capital concept.  Florida argued that the creative class is open to all people and is 
tolerant, and this will spur economic and social growth.  Twenge pointed out that “Generation 
Me” is more accepting of race and ethnicity than previous generations.  “Generation Me” had the 
highest rates of interracial dating and marriage, and the presidential election of 2008 
demonstrated the generation’s openness to race by electing the first African American to the 
White House.  The election of Barack Obama was inconceivable to previous generations, yet for 
Generation Me the election of an African American was not a big deal.   
 For Richard Florida, the openness to sexual orientation and race is a key component of 
what makes a community creative.  The Tolerance Index, which includes a measure of openness 
to gays and lesbians, is one of the components that makes up the creative capital index.  Being 
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open to all people is one of the traits that the creative classes possesses that other classes may 
not.  Other scholars have confirmed that tolerance does predict innovation.  Chirot (1994) 
described how innovation often occurs in areas that were not at the center of power, but in areas 
where many different people mixed.  According to Chirot (1994: 49) “the most innovative and 
dynamic parts were not just little states on the edge of the civilization, but merchant cities.”  
These merchant cities were areas where people from all over the world came to trade.  The 
mixture of different people in one area produced new ideas, concepts, and inventions.  Merchant 
cities were the areas that drove change in society by adapting to new ideas. 
 Merchant cities are what Sassen (2006) called global cities.  Today, a handful of cities 
dominate world trade.  Cities such as New York, London, Tokyo, and Hong Kong control 
financial markets and are the leading innovative cities in the world (Sassen 2006).  Global cities 
have become the leaders in many industries because of the influx of different people into such 
cities.  As more people go to these global cities to trade more ideas are shared, thus 
merchant/global/creative cities become the most diverse cities in the world by the exposure of 
different people found in these cities. 
 Zachary (2000) described how diversity correlates with economic development.  
According to Zachary (2000), areas with large populations of “hybrid” people are the most 
advanced countries.  As countries become more diverse, people in these nations start to inter-
marry and create inter-racial populations.  However, it is the flow of ideas that is the key to 
development.  More diverse populations have more innovations due to the influx of new cultures 
and ideas.  The correlation Zachary explained between people inter-marrying is similar to the 
Tolerance Index described by Florida.  
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 Rutten and Gelissen (2008) tested Florida’s creative capital model by examining 94 
European regions.  They found that diversity (tolerance) was related to the regional wealth.  
Regions with greater diversity did have greater wealth than areas with low levels of diversity.  
Moreover, Rutten and Gelissen (2008) found that the level of diversity increased the levels of 
technology and talent in the region.    
Segregation 
 Even with Florida’s assertion that exposure to the creative class will make any negative 
social ills moot, sociologists and other social scientists have demonstrated that segregation has 
many negative consequences (Cutler and Glaeser 1997; Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney 1996; 
Shihadeh and Flynn 1996; Yinger 1998).  One consequence of segregation is higher crime rates 
and victimization rates in segregated neighborhoods (Kposowa, Breault, and Harrison 1995; 
Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney 1996; Sampson and Wilson 1995; Shihadeh and Flynn 1996).   
One reason that segregation may lead to higher levels of crime is because the neighborhoods lack 
social capital.  In poor neighborhoods, residents are often continually moving in and out of the 
community.  The high level of residential turnover does not allow social bonds to develop.  Shaw 
and McKay (1942) suggested that a high rate of residential turnover decreased community social 
control and increased institutional disruption.  Sampson (1985) found that increased residential 
mobility was positively related to violent crime.  Even controlling for neighborhood factors, 
Sampson found that residents of highly mobile neighborhoods experienced double the rates of 
violent victimization as compared to residents in low mobility neighborhoods.  Similarly, Smith 
and Jarjoura (1988) found that robbery and assault increased as residential mobility increased. 
 In her book Social Sources of Delinquency (1978), Kornhauser argued that the poor who 
live in diverse neighborhoods and move frequently will always experience more crime.  
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Reviewing a large number of empirical studies, Kornhauser concluded that residents who move 
frequently cannot form social bonds with other residents and institutions.  The loss of these 
bonds allows delinquents to act in negative ways toward the community. 
 Bursik and Webb (1982) focused on Shaw and McKay’s residential mobility concept and 
studied its effects on crime.  Neighborhoods with high total population turnover remained high 
crime areas when new ethnicities moved to them.  When an immigrant group moved out of the 
neighborhood, the new immigrant group maintained the high delinquency rates as the previous.  
Meanwhile the immigrant group that left the high crime neighborhood saw a decline in their 
delinquency rate.  Moreover, Bursik and Webb found that when neighborhood populations 
stabilized, crime decreased.  African American neighborhoods with low residential mobility had 
crime rates similar to other races, but African American neighborhoods with high residential 
mobility had higher crime rates than other groups. 
     The studies mentioned above all point to the implications of communities lacking bonds.  
People living in neighborhoods with high residential mobility do not get to know each other and 
share a common vision of what the community could and should be.  This has led to what 
Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) have termed collective efficacy.  Collective efficacy is 
“the linkage of mutual trust and the shared willingness to intervene for the common good” 
(Sampson 2002a; 232).  The idea behind collective efficacy is that the residents in a community 
will engage with each other to form a common idea of what the neighborhood will be like.  
Residents in a community will have shared expectations of what is correct behavior and what is 
incorrect behavior.  As the residents in a neighborhood agree on the expectations of the 
neighborhood, crime will decrease as residents will stop deviant behavior or call the police when 
a deviant act is taking place.   
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 To test whether collective efficacy has an effect on crime Sampson, Raudenbush, and 
Earls (1997) surveyed 8,782 residents in 343 Chicago neighborhoods.  The survey consisted of 
questions aimed at measuring the collective efficacy of the neighborhood.  The respondents were 
asked to measure how likely it would be for a neighbor would intervene in various behaviors in 
the community and how willing the neighbor would be to help.  Controlling for concentrated 
disadvantage, residential mobility, foreign born population, age, race, socioeconomic status, and 
home ownership, the authors found that collective efficacy reduced the amount of violent crime 
in the neighborhood.  Neighborhoods with high collective efficacy had lower rates of violent 
crime than neighborhoods with low collective efficacy.   
 Collective efficacy is similar to what Putnam has termed social capital.  Crime increases 
as social capital, or collective efficacy, decreases.  Vold, Bernard, and Snipes (2002: 130) 
explained: 
Because of this low social capital, neighbors are not able to exert effective control over 
public or common areas, such as streets and parks, and so these areas are free to be taken 
over by criminals.  In addition, local teenagers have considerable freedom because of the 
anonymity of the neighborhood means that they and their friends are unknown to adults 
even though the teenagers may be only a short distance from their homes.    
 
 Research has found that unsupervised peer groups led to a number of negative outcomes, 
including increased delinquency (Haynie and Osgood 2005; Osgood and Anderson 2004), heavy 
alcohol use (Osgood, Wilson, O’Mally, Bachman, and Johnston 1996), and an increased number 
of sexual partners for youth (Browning, Burrington, Leventhal, and Brooks-Gunn 2008).  
Sampson (2002b) provided evidence that collective efficacy reduces the amount of unsupervised 
peer groups in the community.  Intervention is also more likely in a community with a high level 
of collective efficacy when teenaged peer groups are hanging out or loitering (Sampson 2002b).  
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Mazerolle, Wicker, and McBroom (2010) found that collective efficacy reduced crime in 
Australia, which demonstrates the effectiveness of collective efficacy in other countries.   
 Urban areas in the Unites States are still segregated along racial and ethnic lines (Farley 
and Squires 2005; Fischer 2003; Roscigno, Karafin, and Tester 2009).  However, some 
researchers have begun to argue that class segregation is now the dominant form of segregation 
(Fischer, Stockmayer, Stiles, and Hout 2004).  In the past, segregation was not due to class 
differences, but to racial and ethnic differences (Brooks 2011; Kain 1968).  Today, there are still 
some effects on segregation which are based on race (Adelman 2005; Fischer 2003), but class 
lines are now being drawn in many cities.  
 The link between economic conditions and crime is well established among 
criminologists (Vold, Bernard, and Snipes 2002).  However, the link is not as easy to figure out 
as one might assume.  Many other factors are involved when examining poverty.  As Shaw and 
McKay concluded, economic status does seem to be correlated with crime, but so do a host of 
other social ills.  It is unclear which factor is causing crime to increase. 
 Criminologists have found that a disproportionate amount of homicides occur in areas 
with a high concentration of poverty (Beasley and Antunes 1974; Bensing and Schroeder 1960; 
Bullock 1955; Mladenka and Hill 1976).  Blau and Blau (1982) examined the 125 largest 
metropolitan areas in the United States.  They found that economic inequality and racial income 
inequality had the strongest effect on crime.  As the economic inequality in the city increased, 
crime in the city increased.  Furthermore, Blau and Blau argued that racial income inequality 
increased crime.  Blau and Blau (1982: 126) stated: 
High rates of criminal violence are apparently the price of racial and economic 
inequalities.  In a society founded on the principle “that all men are created equal” 
economic inequalities rooted in ascribed positions violate the spirit of democracy and are 
likely to create alienation, despair, and conflict.  The hypothesis derived from this 
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assumption, which is also deducible from a general sociological theory, is that racial 
socioeconomic inequalities are a major source of much criminal violence.      
  
Another study attempting to examine the link between poverty and crime was a study 
done by Loftin and Hill (1974).  Loftin and Hill (1974) created a “structural poverty” index, 
which included measures of infant mortality, low educational attainment, one-parent families, 
and income.  The study found that there was a very strong correlation between the structural 
poverty index and state homicide rates.  Using data for 121 central cities in the United States in 
1990, Lee (2000) found that concentrated poverty was much more important in predicting 
homicides than the overall poverty level.  In other words, when a neighborhood is segregated 
from people of other socioeconomic statuses, homicides increase.   
 John Hagan (1994) examined high crime areas in the United States and Canada.  He 
found that areas characterized by concentrated poverty were more likely to have high crime 
rates.  Hagan stated that these neighborhoods had a large amount of disinvestment from 
businesses and government agencies.  The disinvestment in the neighborhood guaranteed that the 
neighborhood would never be able to develop economically, because no businesses would move 
to the area to provide jobs. Further, government agencies refused to address the problem of 
poverty in these areas.  Instead, residents in these concentrated poverty areas found alternative 
means to making money, such as selling illegal drugs and prostitution.   
 Demonstrating how employment can affect crime, Reid (2003) examined the labor 
market of Boston and Atlanta.  Reid stated that Boston raised the number of high-skilled service 
sector jobs and experienced a decrease in crime.  Atlanta increased the number of low-skill 
service sector jobs and experienced an increase in crime.  Reid argued that the low-skill jobs 
found in Atlanta did not reduce poverty in the city, thus, Atlanta saw an increase in crime.  On 
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the other hand, by bringing in high-skill jobs, which pay more money, Boston saw a decrease in 
crime.  
        This is a small sample of the studies that have found links between crime and poverty.  
However, it should be clear from reading these studies that there are many problems with linking 
poverty and crime.  If crime is influenced by economic conditions, then when there is an 
economic depression one would expect to see crime increase. Conversely, during an economic 
boom, it would be expected that crime would decrease.  However, this is not the case.  In the 
1960s and 1970s the United States experienced an economic boom, and crime increased during 
this period.  During the 1990s, crime decreased during a similar economic boom (Vold, Bernard, 
and Snipes 2002).  Thus, crime has been associated with both increases and decreases in crime 
during economic booms.  Additionally, Long and White (1981) demonstrated that during 
economic downturns, the rate of crime did not increase. 
 Segregation is not only linked to higher crime rates, but it has been shown to be linked to 
reduced educational attainment, poorer educational quality, decreased high school graduation, 
unemployment, and decreased income (Cutler and Glaeser 1997; Yinger 1998).  Cutler and 
Glaeser (1997) argued that many of the negative outcomes of segregation were due to decreased 
educational exposure for the people in segregated areas.   
  If the creative class segregate themselves, similar outcomes could be expected along 
creative and noncreative class lines.  Creative class people will send their children to better 
schools, whether it is public or private high schools.  Creative class parents have the money to do 
so, as well as the opportunity to live in neighborhoods that provide excellent education to their 
children.   
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Furthermore, creative class children are more likely to attend more prestigious 
universities, which only widens the gap between the creative class and everyone else.  Because 
the creative class can afford to send their children to private schools or live in areas with good 
public schools, the creative class children will be better prepared for college.  Writing in 1961, 
Conant explained that as the president of Harvard he did not admit many lower income 
individuals and children from slum areas to his university.  He stated that this low admittance 
was not due to racism or any ill will toward the people in slum areas, but because the children 
had fallen so far behind that it was impossible for them to meet the standards to be admitted to 
Harvard.   
This may seem like the comment of an individual in an elite position looking down on the 
poor and suggesting that they cannot possibly compete with the Harvard students.  But Conant 
enacted many policies while at Harvard to change the structure of not only Harvard but the entire 
university system.  Conant “was alarmed by the thought that America might develop a hereditary 
aristocracy consisting of exactly the sort of well-bred young men he was training in Cambridge” 
(Brooks 2000: 26).  To make sure this hereditary aristocracy did not develop, Conant changed 
from admitting only elite students to making admission based on merit.  In 1952, the incoming 
verbal SAT score for freshman was 583 and across the Ivy League universities, the average score 
was around 500 (Brooks 2000).  By 1960, the average verbal SAT score had jumped to 678 with 
math score of 695 (Brooks 2000).  “The average Harvard freshman in 1952 would have placed in 
the bottom 10 percent of the Harvard freshman class of 1960” (Brooks 2000: 26).        
In addition to the increased competition of getting into college, the cost of a college 
degree has been increasing steadily over the decades (Ehrenberg 2000).  Today, for many lower 
class people a college degree is out of reach.  The increase in tuition has guaranteed that many 
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children of service and working class backgrounds will remain there as they cannot afford to 
send their children to college – especially not a prestigious university to which the creative class 
will send their children to (Eide, Brewer, and Ehrenberg 1998).   
 Florida’s creative class model may be segregating people along creative and noncreative 
lines.  Cities that follow this model in order to develop economically may experience increases in 
crime, decreases in educational quality and attainment, and a host of other social problems.  It is 
important to understand the social consequences for development along the creative class model. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  METHODS 
 To begin to explore the possible outcomes of a metropolitan area’s shift to creative 
capital, the current study examined creative capital in the metropolitan area as a whole, along 
with counties designated as urban and suburban.  The designation of a county as urban or 
suburban was based on the Office of Management and Budget bulletin (2009) found on the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s website.  The bulletin lists counties together as part of a metropolitan statistical 
area (MSA).  For example, the counties that comprise the MSA of Des Moines, Iowa are:  
Dallas, Guthrie, Madison, Polk, and Warren.  Next, the county with the largest percentage of the 
population for the MSA was labeled as urban, while the other counties were labeled as suburban.  
From the previous example, in the Des Moines MSA, Polk County would be designated as 
urban, while the others would be suburban counties. 
 This labeling system was not perfect, as some cities have a large population in more than 
one county.  In the circumstance that a large percentage of the population was distributed among 
two counties, both would be labeled as urban.  An example of this was in the Minneapolis-St. 
Paul, Minnesota MSA.  This MSA is comprised of thirteen counties, with a large percentage of 
the population spread across Hennepin and Ramsey counties.  Therefore, Hennepin and Ramsey 
counties were labeled as urban, and the other counties as suburban.  The final sample size for this 
study was 345, with 207 urban counties and 138 suburban counties included in the study. 
 Next, data was gathered from the years 1990, 2000, and 2008 in order to gauge the 
impact that creative capital had on MSA, urban, and suburban counties.  Selection of these time 
periods allowed the study to examine any changes that may have occurred over a 28-year period.  
Moreover, use of data from these years allowed the study to examine whether changes in 
economic circumstances affected the creative capital of an area.  In 1990, the United States was 
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ending the Cold War, and was prosperous.  The economic prosperity of the 1990s culminated in 
2000 in a large economic boom for the country.  Finally, 2008 began to capture the Dot.Com 
bust and the beginning of the Great Recession.  Comparison of these years allowed the study to 
examine whether larger economic issues increased or decreased the rise of creative capital for 
which Richard Florida advocates. 
 The United States Census Bureau collected information for all counties in 1990 and 2000.  
However, in 2008 the Census Bureau only collected information for counties with a population 
of 50,000 or more.  This restricted the sample size of the current study.  However, many of the 
counties that could not be included in the current study were small, ex-urban counties.  These 
counties are often a long distance from the urban core and have a small population.  While these 
counties are changing, and in the future could provide important information, for the current 
study they may have obscured any findings.  In 2008, these counties may have been more 
accurately considered to be rural, as they had not yet been fully developed.  For instance, 
Washington County, Missouri is part of the St. Louis MSA.  However, the population of the 
county was 24,304 in 2008.  Thus, this county was not included in the current study.  On the 
other hand, St. Louis County,  a suburban county in the St. Louis MSA, had a population of 
991,830 in 2008.  St. Louis County was included in the study.  A list of the counties included in 
the study can be found in Appendix A. 
Creative Capital Variables 
   The creative class measure was created from McGranahan and Wojan’s (2007) study.  
McGranahan and Wojan argued that Florida’s measure of the creative class was too simplistic.  
The authors recast Florida’s creative class measure using standard occupational classifications 
from the Office of Management and Budget.  According to McGranahan and Wojan, some of the 
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jobs included in the classification of creative class did not fit the concept of creative.  Some 
occupations were proportional to the population, thus areas would score more creative than these 
counties actually were.  For example, Florida included farm managers in his classification of the 
creative class.  While farm manager may have a great deal of creativity, this occupation is not 
useful in explaining urban development.  Moreover, McGranahan and Wojan excluded teachers 
from the creative capital measure.  The authors argued that teachers are proportional to the 
population, which would skew how creative some areas are.  
 The current study used the same classification system as McGranahan and Wojan.  
However, McGranahan and Wojan provided information for 1990 and 2000 only.  The current 
study recreated their measure for 2008.  Occupations that comprise the creative class are listed in 
Table 2.  From this classification system, three variables were created for this study: creative 
class, noncreative class, and art class.  Creative class was the percentage of the population 
employed in creative class jobs.  Noncreative class was the percentage of the population 
employed in noncreative jobs.  Arts class was the percentage of the population employed in art, 
design, entertainment, sports, and the media, which Florida argued was a creative group that 
differs from the regular creative class.      
 Using McGranahan and Wojan’s article as a guide, variables which could aid in our 
understanding of what comprises the creative class were then selected from the United States 
Census Bureau.  Population density was used in the current analysis to gauge whether the 
creative class enjoys living in dense urban areas, which is what Florida argued.  Percent of the 
population that was African American was also included in McGranahan and Wojan’s study, and 
was included in the current study as well. 
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African Americans have been the most segregated group in the United States and may be 
being locked out of the creative class.  Thus, this variable was used to understand whether the 
creative class segregates itself along race and ethnic lines.  The percentage of the population that 
was foreign born was included by McGranahan and Wojan and was utilized in the current study 
as well.  Richard Florida argued that the creative class is made up of foreign born residents, and 
that the creative class likes to live in areas with diversity.  Hence, this variable was used to test 
Florida’s assertion.  Finally, three age structure variables were used in the current study:  ages 17 
and below, ages 18 to 44, and ages 65 and over.  These age variables differ from the variables 
used by McGranahan and Wojan.  The current study used these variables to explore whether the 
creative class lives in areas with children and the elderly.  Florida described the creative class as 
young and college educated, but with the definition of the creative class being based upon 
occupations, it would follow that the creative class should be of working age.  Thus, the study 
examined whether urban and suburban creative class are raising children and caring for the 
elderly.  All variables were collected from the United States Census Bureau. 
Creative Segregation and Creative Exposure 
 Florida argued that the creative class loves diversity, and a large creative class will 
expose others to their ideas.  He asserted that integration of the creative class into a city will 
eventually be an economic and social benefit to all, even those not in the creative class.  
However, Florida provided no evidence of this, other than his assertion of its truth.  
To test Florida’s assumption, the current study utilized Cutler and Glaeser’s (1997) 
measures of housing segregation and educational exposure.  Cutler and Glaeser were interested  
in investigating racial segregation, but for the current study, the variable of noncreative class is 
substituted for race.  Therefore, a creative segregation measure and a creative exposure measure  
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Table 2: Florida’s Original Creative Class Occupations and the Creative Class Recast by 
McGranahan and Wojan 
 
STF4 occupation file 
 
Florida 
McGranahan 
and Wojan 
 
Excluded 
Management occupations Summary   
Top executives X X  
Advertising, marketing, promotions, public relations, and sales 
managers 
X X  
Financial managers X X  
Operations specialists managers X X  
Farmers and farm managers X  X 
Other management occupations X X  
Business and financial operations occupations  Summary   
Business operations specialists X  X 
Accountants and auditors X X  
Other financial specialists X  X 
Computer and mathematical occupations Summary Summary  
Architecture and engineering occupations Summary Summary  
Architects, surveyors, and cartographers X X  
Engineers X X  
Drafters, engineering, and mapping technicians X X  
Life, physical, and social service occupations Summary   
Life and physical sciences X X  
Social scientists and related workers X X  
Life, physical, and social science technicians X  X 
Legal occupations Summary   
Lawyers X X  
Judges, magistrates, and other judicial workers X  X 
Legal support workers X  X 
Education, training, and library occupations Summary   
Post-secondary teachers X X  
Teachers, primary, secondary, and special education X  X 
Teachers, pre-school, kindergarten, elementary, and middle 
school 
X  X 
Teachers, secondary school X  X 
Teachers, special education X  X 
Librarians, curators, and archivists X X  
Other teachers, instructors, education training, and library 
occupations 
X  X 
Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations Summary Summary  
Healthcare practitioners and technical occupations Summary   
Physicians and surgeons X  X 
Registered nurses X  X 
Therapists X  X 
Other health diagnosis and treating practitioners and technical 
occupations  
X  X 
Health technologies and technicians  X  X 
High-end sales: part of sales occupation summary category    
Sales representative, services, wholesale and manufacturing X X  
Other sales and related occupations, including supervisors X X  
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were created.  The creative segregation measure allows the study to examine whether the 
creative class is segregated from the noncreative class.  The creative exposure measure allows 
the study to explore whether the creative class does interact with the noncreative class, which 
would suggest that ideas then get passed on to the noncreative class.   
 The creative segregation measure was defined as  
 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 12 �𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 −  𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 �, 
where noncreativei is the population of the noncreative class in the county.  Noncreative is the 
population of the noncreative class in the MSA.  Creativei is the population of the creative class 
in the county, and creative is the population of the creative class in the MSA.  If the noncreative 
class is distributed evenly throughout the MSA, the absolute value for the county will be zero.  If 
the creative and noncreative classes never reside in the same counties, the absolute value will be 
one.  
 The creative exposure variable was defined as 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 = �𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖
𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
�  ×  � 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
� −  � 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
�, 
where noncreativei is the population of noncreative class in the county.  Noncreative is the 
population of the noncreative class in the MSA.  Educationi is the population enrolled in college 
or graduate school in the county, and education is the population enrolled in college and graduate 
school in the MSA.  Populationi is the population in the county and population is the population 
in the MSA.  The creative exposure measure will be greater than zero if noncreative class people 
live in counties with more educated people, which Florida argued is one of the main traits of the 
creative class.  The creative exposure measure will be less than zero if the noncreative classes do 
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not live in counties with educated people.  All variables were collected from the United States 
Census Bureau for 1990, 2000, and 2008. 
Crime and the Creative Class 
    To examine whether the change for cities to creative capital, and the changing 
demographics associated with the creative class, has any effect on crime, , the study followed 
methods utilized by Blau and Blau (1982).  While Blau and Blau’s study is older than the 
concept of the creative class, the study is a classic in examining metropolitan crime.  The 
variables used in the current study were taken from Blau and Blau’s classic examination of the 
structural causes of crime.  
 Crime data was obtained from the FBI Uniform Crime Report (UCR) for the years 1990, 
2000, and 2008.  The UCR began collecting data for crimes reported to the police in 1930 
(Mosher, Miethe, and Phillips 2002).  Today, the UCR collects data from around the United 
States for nearly 17,000 law enforcement agencies.  The collection of crime data can be 
problematic.  For instance, crimes reported to the police can be swayed by the community’s 
feelings toward the police, and crimes can be classified differently in different areas (Mosher, 
Miethe, and Phillips 2002).  However, the UCR is recognized by scholars as being the best 
source of data for crimes committed in the United States. 
 For the present study, the total number of crimes provided by the UCR was converted to 
rates.  This was done by dividing the total number of crimes committed by the population of the 
state and then multiplying by 100,000: 
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  � 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
�  × 100,000. 
Converting the total number of crimes to rates makes comparisons possible.  A county with a 
large population will naturally have more crimes committed because of the larger number of 
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people when compared to a smaller county.  Rates control for the population of the county by 
illustrating how many crimes will be committed for every 100,000 people in the county. 
 Based on the Blau and Blau (1982) article, total crime, murder, and property crimes were 
used in the current study.  Property crime consists of larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson.  
Property crime was included to examine whether lesser crimes increase as the creative class 
increases in an area. 
 Control variables followed as closely as possible to Blau and Blau.  However, because 
the current study has a different focus, some deviation was needed.  The population of the county 
was used as a control, and the percentage of individuals below poverty was used in the study to 
provide a control measure of poverty.  The percentage of the population that was in the creative 
class and noncreative class was used as a variable to control for education.  The percentage of 
married households in the county was used as a control, because marriage has been shown to 
decrease crime (Labouvie 1996; Warr 1998).  Finally, because of the economic meltdown, the 
percentage of vacant housing and the unemployment rate of the county were used in the current 
study.  All data was collected from the U.S. Census Bureau.    
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CHAPTER FIVE:  FINDINGS 
Basic percentages were examined to determine where the creative classes were more 
likely to live.  For all counties in 1990, 22.46 percent of the employment was in the creative 
class.  For all counties in 2000, the percentage of employment in creative jobs was 26.83 percent, 
and in 2008 it was 27.41 percent (see Table 3).  There is a rise in the percentage of jobs in the 
creative class from 1990 to 2008.  There was a 22.04 total percent increase in the percentage of 
creative class jobs from 1990 to 2008 (see Table 3).  However, a substantial disparity in growth 
was demonstrated within those years. The largest growth in creative class jobs was from 1990 to 
2000, with a 19.46 percent increase.  From 2000 to 2008 there was only a 2.16 percent increase 
in creative employment.  This suggests that creative employment in the United States has 
stagnated since 2000.   
Table 3:  Creative Class Percent and Art Class Percent for MSA, Urban, and Suburban 
Counties 
 1990 
(min, max) 
2000 
(min, max) 
2008 
(min, max) 
Creative Class    
All 22.46 26.83 27.41 
 (11.91, 39.72) (14.19, 48.09) (13.57, 49.44) 
Urban 21.46 25.37 25.99 
 (12.68, 39.09) (14.19, 47.88) (13.57, 49.44) 
Suburban 23.97 29.03 29.53 
 (11.91, 39.72) (15.47, 48.09) (16.07, 47.01) 
Art Class    
All 1.15 1.17 1.17 
 (.54, 6.53) (.50, 6.09) (.19, 5.18) 
Urban 1.17 1.19 1.18 
 (.54, 6.53) (.50, 6.09) (.19, 5.18) 
Suburban 1.10 1.12 1.15 
 (.57, 3.17) (.54, 3.68) (.26, 3.44) 
 
When examining urban and suburban counties in 1990, 21.46 percent and 23.97 percent 
of employment was in the creative jobs, respectively (see Table 3).  Suburban counties were 
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found to have more creative employment, which is not the impression that Richard Florida gave 
in his explanation of the creative class.  Moreover, the same pattern followed for the years 2000 
and 2008.  The percentage employed in creative class jobs for urban counties was 25.37 in 2000 
and 25.99 in 2008.  In suburban counties, the percentage employed in creative class jobs was 
29.03 in 2000 and 29.53 in 2008.  From 1990 to 2008, suburban counties increased creative class 
employment by 23.19 percent while urban counties increased by 21.11 percent.  Again, a 
disparity in growth was found within the years examined. Most growth for urban and suburban 
counties took place between 1990 and 2000, with an 18.22 percent increase in urban counties 
and a 21.11 percent increase in suburban counties.  Creative class job growth in suburban 
counties was much smaller from 2000 to 2008, with a 1.72 percent increase, while urban 
counties experienced a 2.44 percent increase. 
When examining the artistic employment, there is an increase over time for all counties, 
from 1.15 percent in 1990 to 1.17 percent in 2008.  However, this is a small increase of only 1.74 
percent over this time period.  Following the pattern of the creative class, art class employment 
had the largest increase from 1990 to 2000, which accounted for all 1.74 percent.  From 2000 to 
2008 the percentage of people employed in artistic jobs remained the same, at 1.17 percent.  
There was no increase in the percent of people employed in art class from 2000 to 2008. 
When examining the art class employment for urban and suburban counties, an opposite 
pattern from that of creative class employment emerged.  There was a larger percent of people 
employed in art class jobs in urban counties than in suburban counties.  In urban counties in 
1990, the art class employment accounted for 1.17 percent of the people employed.  In 2000, the 
art class rose to 1.19 percent but then decreased to 1.18 percent in 2008.  For suburban counties 
in 1990, 1.10 percent of jobs were in the art class.  Suburban counties experienced an increase in 
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art class jobs, from 1.12 percent in 2000 to 1.15 percent in 2008.  The higher percentage of the 
art class in urban areas may be the reason that the creative class is seen as an urban phenomenon.  
Art class employment is more likely to be seen as creative by the general public.  Creative class 
jobs include doctors, lawyers, and engineers, while those in the art class are employed in the 
media, athletics, and art.  People are more likely to associated art class jobs with being highly 
creative, and thus they might conclude that urban areas are where creative class people choose to 
live. 
The opposite shift also occurred when examining the percentage of change of the art class 
over time.  From 1990 to 2008, urban counties experienced a .85 percent increase in art class 
employment while suburban counties had a 4.54 percent increase.  More art class jobs were 
being created in suburban counties.  As more creative jobs move to urban areas, the art class 
seems to be moving to suburban areas. 
Multiple Analysis of Covariance (MANCOVA) 
 To determine if there was a significant difference between urban and suburban counties 
in creative and art class employment, a MANCOVA was performed.  MANCOVA compares 
categorical independent variables to mean group differences for the dependent variables 
(Tabachnick and Fidell 2007).  Therefore, the current study examined whether urban and 
suburban counties differed significantly in the percentage of people employed in the creative and 
in the art class.  Covariates were added to the model to control for other factors that might make 
urban and suburban counties different. 
 The dependent variables in the model were the percent of people employed in the creative 
class and the percent of people employed in the art class.  The independent variable in the model 
was county type, which was labeled 1 for urban and 2 for suburban (see the methods section for 
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the description of how counties were designated as urban or suburban).  The percentage of the 
population that was African American, the percentage of the population that was foreign born, 
the population of the county, and the percent of individuals below poverty were added as 
covariates in the model.  These covariates were included based on what Richard Florida 
described as being significant indicators of the creative class and based on past studies in 
community and urban development.  A MANCOVA was run for the years 1990, 2000, and 2008. 
 Before beginning the MANCOVA, the assumptions of the model must be met.  The first 
assumption is that there have to be independent observations or uncorrelated cases (Field 2009; 
Tabachnick and Fidell 2007).  There was no correlation for the variables in the model 
(Appendices K – S), thus, this assumption was met.  The next assumption is that there must be 
equal group sizes.  Urban had a sample size of 189 and suburban had a sample size of 132 for 
1990.  For 2000, the urban sample was 188 and the suburban sample was 132.  Finally, for 2008, 
the urban sample was 180 and the suburban sample was 128.  Hence, this assumption was 
violated.  Therefore, examining the outcome of the MANCOVA is done with some caution.  
However, the study is justified in moving forward as the sample sizes were not extremely 
different, and the study cannot increase the number of suburban counties.  The U.S. Census 
Bureau does not provide all the needed information for all counties in the year 2008 (as 
discussed in the methods section).  Therefore, the current study could only include the counties 
for which the U.S. Census Bureau does provide data.   
 The next assumption is that there is a normal distribution for the dependent variables.  
The percent of creative class was normally distributed in all three years.  However, the art class 
was not normally distributed for 1990, 2000, and 2008.  To solve this problem, art class percent 
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was transformed using log10 transformation, which then allowed the study to meet this 
assumption.  Next, all outliers were taken out of the analysis for the years 1990, 2000, and 2008. 
The final assumption is homogeneity of variance, which means that the variances in each group 
are roughly equal.  Box’s M Test was used to test for homoscedasticity.  In 1990, Box’s M Test 
was significant at the p < .001 level, which means that the assumption was violated.  Once again, 
the findings of the MANCOVA will be interpreted with caution.  For 2000, Box’s M Test was 
significant at the p < .05 level as was the Box’s M Test for 2008.  Next the Levene’s Test was 
used to examine which dependent variable was homoscedastic.  For 1990, 2000, and 2008 the 
creative class measure was not significant, which suggested that this variable met the assumption 
for homogeneity of variance.  The art class variable was significant at the p < .05 level for 1990 
and 2000, but was not significant in 2008.  The percentage of the population employed in the art 
class is problematic for the assumption of homogeneity of variance.   
 After running the MANCOVA, Wilks’ Lambda was examined to explore whether the 
creative class and art class were significantly different in percentage of people employed in 
urban and suburban counties.  For 1990 and 2000, the county type was significant at the p < .001 
level.  This means that there was a significant difference between the creative and art classes in 
urban and suburban areas.  In 2008, Wilks’ Lambda was not significant, which means that there 
was no difference between urban and suburban counties in that year.  Examination of the K 
Matrix reveals that in 1990, creative class is significant at the p < .025 level and art class is 
significant at the p < .001 level.  In 2000, the K Matrix reveals that the creative class is 
significant at the p < .001 level and art class is significant at the p < .001 level.   
 The violation of some assumptions means that the outcomes have to be viewed with 
caution.  However, the results followed the same pattern as the percentages discussed previously.  
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For the years 1990 and 2000, there was a significant difference in the amount of people 
employed in creative class and art class jobs.  As the percentages demonstrated, the largest 
growth was during this period.  In 2008, there was no significant difference, which, again, 
followed the pattern of the percentages discussed earlier.  From 2000 to 2008 there was slow 
growth in the creative class and art class.  Also, the percentages seemed to demonstrate that there 
was a shift from growth of the creative class in the suburbs to the urban counties.  For the art 
class, however, the growth shifted from urban to suburban.  This may explain why there is no 
significant difference between urban and suburban counties in 2008, as the shift had decreased 
the difference between the two.    
Creative Class Regressions for All Counties 
      OLS regression allows a researcher to examine the effect an independent variable has on 
the dependent variable (Lewis-Beck 1980).  Because the current study has more than one 
independent variable in the model, multiple regressions were used.  This allows the researcher to 
get a “fuller explanation of the dependent variable, since few phenomena are products of a single 
cause” (Lewis-Beck 1980: 47).  In the equation, the dependent variable is seen as a linear 
function of more than one independent variable. 
Y = a0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + …..bkXk + e 
 In the equation above, Y = the dependent variable, X = the independent variable, a = the 
intercept, b = the slope, and e = the error term.  The intercept (a) is the value of the dependent 
variable (Y) when all independent variables (X) are equal to zero.  The slope (b) is the average 
change in the dependent variable (Y) associated with a one unit change in the independent 
variable (X) when all other independent variables are held constant.     
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 In order to have confidence in the outcome of the regression, assumptions need to be met.  
The first assumption of multiple regression is that there is no specification error (Berry and 
Feldman 1985; Lewis-Beck 1980).  This means that it is assumed that in a population there is a 
specific way the set of independent variables influence the dependent variable (Berry and 
Feldman 1985).  If this assumption is broken, it means that the wrong model has been estimated.  
This assumption was met, as there is theoretical justification for including all the variables in the 
models that were run.  Moreover, the exclusion of some variables, such as percent African 
American, meant that the models were not overspecified. 
 The second assumption is that there is no measurement error.  The measures used for this 
study were from the FBI Uniform Crime Report and the U.S. Census Bureau.  The assumption 
was met in the current analysis because the measures have been used previously in a wide variety 
of numerous studies. 
 The third assumption is that the variables not be correlated.  The current analysis ran a 
large number of regressions, but this was to ensure that this assumption be met.  Different crimes 
are highly correlated with each other, so many regressions needed to be run to ensure that this 
assumption was met.   
 The fourth assumption is that there is linearity between the independent and dependent 
variable.  This assumption means that for each independent variable, the amount of change in the 
dependent variable associated with a unit increase in the independent variable (holding all other 
independent variable constant) is the same.  Scatterplots were examined before any models were 
run.  Some variables displayed outliers.  Berry and Feldman (1985) and Lewis-Beck (1980) 
suggested that to deal with outliers one could transform the variables.  Variables that had outliers 
were transformed, which will be discussed later in the findings section.   
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To find out which characteristics make up a creative class community, multiple 
regressions were performed.  First, a regression with the data from all counties for 1990, 2000, 
and 2008 was conducted.  Next, data for urban counties from 1990, 2000, and 2008 were run.  
Finally, data for suburban counties from 1990, 2000, and 2008 were run.  The data for all 
counties had a few variables that were nonlinear thus these variables were transformed by using 
the log10 transformation (Berry and Feldman 1985).  For the 1990 data, the percent of the 
population that was African American, population density, percent of the county that was foreign 
born, percent of the population that was 65 or older, and the unemployment rate were 
transformed using the log10 transformation.  For the 2000 data, the percent of the population that 
was African American, population density, percent of the county that was foreign born, percent 
of the population that was 65 or older, and the unemployment rate were transformed using the 
log10 transformation.  Finally, for the 2008 data, the percent of the population that was African 
American, population density, percent of the county that was foreign born, percent of the 
population that was 65 or older, and the percent of the population that was 18 to 44 were 
transformed using the log10 transformation.      
 Furthermore, because of correlations between the percent of the population that was 18 to 
44 and the percent of the population that was 65 or older (-.733) for 1990, the percent of the 
population that was 18 to 44 and the percent of the population that was 65 or older (-.734) for 
2000, the percent of the population that was under 17 and the percent of the population that was 
65 or older (-.605) for 2000, and the percent of the population that was under 17 and the percent 
of the population that was 65 or older (-.630) for 2008, separate regressions were run for each 
age category.   
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 Examination of Table 4 demonstrates that in 1990 a number of variables were significant.  
The percentage of the population that was African American was significant at the p < .01 level.  
This suggests that in 1990, counties with a higher percentage of African Americans were more 
creative than counties with a smaller percentage of African Americans.  However, the percentage 
of the county that was African American was not significant for 2000 or 2008 (see Table 4).  As 
creative class individuals moved to areas in 1990 that had a larger percentage of African 
Americans, the creative class individuals increased the cost of living in the area.   
A similar progression is seen over time with the percentage of the population that was foreign 
born.  In 1990, 2000, and 2008 as the percent of the population that was foreign born increased, 
the percentage of the population in the creative class increased (see Table 4).  Richard Florida 
emphasized the importance of foreign born residents and diversity for the creative class, the 
current results suggest that as the creative class individuals are more likely to live in areas with a 
larger foreign born population.   
 While diversity seems to thrive in areas that are creative, the population density of a 
community also plays a role in creative areas.  As can be seen in Table 4, as the population 
density of a county increased, the creative class percent increased for the years under study.  
Florida suggested that creative class individuals prefer to live in densely populated urban areas.  
The data demonstrates that creative class individuals do increase the population density of the 
community.  This is also representative of the authentic, gritty areas that Zukin (2010) described 
that rich hipster individuals strive to live in. 
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Table 4:  OLS Regression with Creative Class Percent All Counties Standardized Coefficients (Standard Error) 
 1990 2000 2008 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  Model 6 Model 7 Model 8  Model 9 
Black % .14** 
(.00) 
.09* 
(.00) 
.12** 
(.00) 
-.07 
(.00) 
-.09* 
(.00)_ 
-.08 
(.02) 
-.06 
(.01) 
-.06 
(.01) 
.09 
(.01) 
Unemployment -.69*** 
(.01) 
-.60*** 
(.01) 
-.62*** 
(.01) 
-.65*** 
(.01) 
-.61*** 
(.01) 
-.60*** 
(.00) 
-.49*** 
(.02) 
-.49*** 
(.03) 
-.43*** 
(.03) 
Population Density .12* 
(.00) 
.12** 
(.00) 
.15** 
(.00) 
.22*** 
(.01) 
.21*** 
(.00) 
.23*** 
(.01) 
.18** 
(.01) 
.18** 
(.01) 
.22*** 
(.01) 
Foreign Born % .34*** 
(.01) 
.30*** 
(.00) 
.32*** 
(.01) 
.27*** 
(.01) 
.26*** 
(.01) 
.24*** 
(.01) 
.31*** 
(.01) 
.27*** 
(.01) 
.22*** 
(.01) 
Age 17 and Under .00 
(.00) 
  .05 
(.00) 
  -.16*** 
(.00) 
  
Age 18 to 44  .24*** 
(.05) 
  .11** 
(.06) 
  -.07 
(.03) 
 
Age 65 and Over   -.22*** 
(.01) 
  -.21*** 
(.00) 
  -.15** 
(.03) 
R2 .52 .57 .57 .55 .56 .59 .38 .36 .37 
N 344 344 344 344 344 344 333 333 333 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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  Counties that have lower unemployment rates have a larger percentage of creative class 
individuals (see Table 4).  For 1990, 2000, and 2008 a decrease in the unemployment rate 
increased the percentage of the creative class in the county.  The mobility of the creative class 
was discussed in Chapter III of the present study.  Richard Florida’s assertion that the creative 
class will move to areas and creative class jobs will follow seems to be supported by the current 
results.  One cannot ascertain whether these counties had creative jobs and then the creative class 
moved to the area, or vice versa.  However, counties that can sustain a higher employment rate 
see an increase in the creative class. 
   When examining the age structure of the county, the regressions demonstrate that the age 
of the county does play a role in the creativity of the county.  In 2000 and 2008, the percentage 
of the population that was under 17 was significant and negatively related to the creativity of the 
county.  In 1990 and 2000 the percentage of the population that was 18 to 44 was significant and 
positive, and in 1990, 2000, and 2008 the percentage of the population  that was 65 or over was 
significant and negative (see Table 4).  Counties with larger percentages of young and elderly are 
less creative than counties with larger populations of 18 to 44.  This finding validates Florida’s 
assumption that creative class areas attract younger people.  The working age population is the 
creative class, so counties tailored to the working population will attract the creative class.  For 
counties that have large retirement communities and children, the creative class may pass them 
by.    
Creative Class Regressions for Urban Counties 
 Urban counties demonstrate a similar pattern when all counties were considered as a 
whole.  The percentage of the population that was African American was significant for 1990, 
but for 2000 and 2008 was not significant (see Table 5).  Again, this may suggest that as creative 
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class individuals move to urban counties the cost of living increases and drives out lower income 
groups.   
 The percentage of the population that was foreign born was significant for 1990, 2000, 
and for 2008 (see Table 5).  This is the same pattern as was found above for all counties.  Again, 
this suggests that immigrant groups play a significant role in the creativity of a community. 
Population density was significant for 2000 and 2008 (see Table 5).  As discussed above, 
the creative class may create areas that are the authentic and gritty areas that Zukin (2010) 
described.  Therefore, creative areas become more densely populated over time because that is 
the living situation that creative class people want to emulate.  Once again, the unemployment 
rate was significant and negatively correlated with creative class jobs for 1990, 2000, and 2008.  
Urban counties that can keep the unemployment rate low will see an increase in the creative 
class. 
The age structure of urban counties followed the same pattern as for all counties (see 
Table 5).  In 2000 and 2008, the percentage of the population that was under 17 was significant 
and negatively related to the creativity of the county.  In 1990 and 2000 the percentage of the 
population that was 18 to 44 was significant and positive, and in 1990, 2000, and 2008 the 
percentage of the population that was 65 or over was significant and negative.  Once more, urban 
counties that cater to the working age population are more likely to attract the creative class.  
However, in the year 2008 the working age population was not significant.  This may suggest 
that the economic collapse of 2008 had a significant impact on the occupation structure for the 
creative class. 
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Table 5:  OLS Regression with Creative Class Percent Urban Counties Standardized Coefficients (Standard Error) 
 1990 2000 2008 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  Model 6 Model 7 Model 8  Model 9 
Black % .24** 
(.00) 
.18** 
(.00) 
.22** 
(.00) 
.02 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
.00 
(.01) 
.09 
(.01) 
.06 
(.01) 
.04 
(.01) 
Unemployment -.55*** 
(.02) 
-.44*** 
(.02) 
-.35*** 
(.02) 
-.57*** 
(.02) 
-.52*** 
(.01) 
-.59*** 
(.01) 
-.43*** 
(.03) 
-.42*** 
(.00) 
-.39*** 
(.03) 
Population Density .07 
(.00) 
.08 
(.00) 
.09 
(.00) 
.17* 
(.01) 
.17** 
(.01) 
.21** 
(.01) 
.09 
(.01) 
.17* 
(.01) 
.17* 
(.01) 
Foreign Born % .36** 
(.01) 
.25*** 
(.01) 
.19** 
(.01) 
.36*** 
(.01) 
.27*** 
(.01) 
.28*** 
(.01) 
.39*** 
(.01) 
.29*** 
(.01) 
.24** 
(.01) 
Age 17 and Under -.10 
(.01) 
  
 
-.13* 
(.00) 
  -.32*** 
(.00) 
  
Age 18 to 44  .38*** 
(.05) 
  .27*** 
(.06) 
  .09 
(.03) 
 
Age 65 and Over   -.23*** 
(.02) 
  -.21*** 
(.01) 
  -.15* 
(.03) 
R2 .39 .50 .46 .51 .55 .54 .38 .29 .30 
N 206 206 206 206 206 206 200 200 200 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Creative Class Regressions for Suburban Counties 
 Suburban counties demonstrated that attracting the creative class to the suburbs is 
different than it is for urban areas.  First, the percentage of the population that was African 
American was not significant for 1990 and 2000 (see Table 6).  This finding may have been 
obtained because suburban areas have historically had a lower percentage of African Americans 
than urban counties.  However, in 2008 the percentage of African Americans was significant and 
negative.  As the percentage of African Americans increased the creativity in the suburban 
counties decreased.  The creative classes in the suburbs do not seem to move to areas with 
diversity and then displace African Americans as was seen in urban counties.   
 However, a similar pattern as the urban areas emerged in the suburban areas regarding 
foreign born residents.  As the percentage of the population that was foreign born increased, the 
creative class percent increased for 1990, 2000, and 2008 (see Table 6).  Once again, immigrant 
groups play a significant role in the creativity of a community.   
 Population density was not significant for 1990 (see Table 6).  However, population 
density was significant for 2000 and in two models in 2008.  Thus, creative class residents in the 
suburbs may prefer densely populated areas, and thus create population density in housing 
choices over time. 
The age structure of the suburban counties may shed light onto this finding.  The 
percentage of the population that was under 17 was not significant for 1990, 2000, or 2008 (see 
Table 6).  Suburban areas are more likely to cater to families, which may explain why the young 
do not seem to repel creativity like in urban areas.  However, the age group 65 and over was 
significant and negative for 1990 and 2000.  Over time the creative class may have driven the 
elderly populations out of the suburban areas that they choose to live.  The percentage of the  
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Table 6:  OLS Regression with Creative Class Percent Suburban Counties Standardized Coefficients (Standard Error) 
 1990 2000 2008 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  Model 6 Model 7 Model 8  Model 9 
Black % -.03 
(.01) 
-.04 
(.01) 
-.04 
(.01) 
-.09 
(.01) 
-.09 
(.01) 
-.09 
(.01) 
-.19** 
(.01) 
-.17** 
(.01) 
-.21** 
(.01) 
Unemployment -.72*** 
(.02) 
-.67*** 
(.02) 
-.67*** 
(.02) 
-.68*** 
(.02) 
-.67*** 
(.02) 
-.63*** 
(.02) 
-.57*** 
(.04) 
-.56*** 
(.04) 
-.53*** 
(.04) 
Population Density .01 
(.01) 
.09 
(.01) 
.12 
(.01) 
.19** 
(.01) 
.16* 
(.01) 
.18** 
(.01) 
.14 
(.01) 
.13 
(.01) 
.17* 
(.01) 
Foreign Born % .36*** 
(.01) 
.35** 
(.01) 
.37*** 
(.01) 
.22** 
(.01) 
.22** 
(.01) 
.22** 
(.01) 
.27** 
(.01) 
.26** 
(.01) 
.24** 
(.01) 
Age 17 and Under .01 
(.01) 
  .09 
(.00) 
  -.03 
(.00) 
  
Age 18 to 44  .14* 
(.08) 
  .04 
(.11) 
  -.13* 
(.05) 
 
Age 65 and Over   -.13* 
(.02) 
  -.16** 
(.00) 
  -.17 
(.04) 
R2 .66 .67 .67 .61 .61 .63 .47 .49 .48 
N 137 137 137 137 137 137 132 132 132 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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population that was 18 t o44 was significant and positive for 1990, but significant and negative 
for 2008.  The age structure of the neighborhood is more complicated in suburban areas.  
 Yet again, as the unemployment rate decreased, the creative percent of the county 
increased (see Table 6).  It seems that whether counties are urban or suburban, employment will 
increase the creative class. 
Creative Segregation and Creative Exposure 
  To examine the effects of creative segregation and creative exposure, regression models 
were conducted for 1990, 2000, and 2008.  The equations for creative segregation and creative 
exposure can be found in Chapter IV.  For 1990, 2000, and 2008 the variables of percentage of 
the population that was African American, population, and the percent of the population that was 
foreign born were nonlinear.  Therefore, the log 10 transformation was used for each variable.  In 
addition, the unemployment rate was transformed for the years 1990 and 2000. 
 The regression model for 1990 demonstrated that as creative segregation increased, the 
percent of the creative class increased (see Table 7).  This finding suggests that creative class 
individuals are segregating themselves from noncreative class individuals.  As a county becomes 
more creative, lower class workers move to other areas of the city.  Moreover, the creative 
segregation variable was significant for 2000 and 2008 (see Table 7).  Again, this demonstrated 
that the creative class are segregating themselves from noncreative workers. 
 The creative exposure variable was not significant for 1990, 2000, and 2008 (see Table 
7).  Exposure to educated people did not increase as creative class percent increased.  While 
Florida stated that the creative class would expose others to their ideas, it is clear from the 
current findings that this assertion by Florida may be flawed.  Because creative segregation is 
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significant, the creative exposure variable might be capturing that creative class individuals are 
exposing other creative individuals to their ideas.   
Table 7:  OLS Regression with Creative Class Percent MSA Counties Standardized 
Coefficients (Standard Error) 
 1990 2000 2008 
Black % -.02 
(.07) 
-.08 
(.01) 
-.22** 
(.01) 
Population .16 
(.01) 
.04 
(.01) 
.00 
(.02) 
Unemployment Rate -.76*** 
(.02) 
-.64*** 
(.03) 
-.54*** 
(.05) 
Foreign Born % .34*** 
(.01) 
.34** 
(.01) 
.23** 
(.02) 
Creative Exposure -.05 
(.23) 
-.11 
(.14) 
-05 
(.36) 
Creative Segregation .13* 
(.19) 
.19** 
(.23) 
.25*** 
(.27) 
R2 .61 .60 .49 
N 146 143 139 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
 As in the creative class regression models discussed above, the unemployment rate, and 
the percent of the population that was foreign born were significant (see Table 7).  Foreign born 
percent was significant for 1990, 2000, and 2008, which also differed from previous models.  
This may be due to the fact that only the largest cities in the United States had three or more 
counties.  Immigrant groups often live in larger urban cities (Hyndman et al. 2006); therefore, 
these cities may have had a much larger foreign born population.        
Crime and the Creative Class 
 Some variables were nonlinear, therefore the log 10 transformation was used to correct 
for this violation.  In 1990 the total crime rate, murder rate, property rate, percent of the 
population that was African American, population, percentage of individuals below poverty, the 
percentage of vacant housing, and the unemployment rate were all transformed using the log 10 
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transformation of the variable.  In 2000 the total crime rate, murder rate, property rate, percent of 
the population that was African American, population, percentage of individuals below poverty, 
the percentage of vacant housing, and the unemployment rate were all transformed using the log 
10 of the variable.  In 2008 the murder rate, percent of the population that was African 
American, population, and the percentage of vacant housing were all transformed using the log 
10 of the variable.   
 To examine the effect that creativity has on crime, regressions were run for 1990, 2000, 
and 2008 for all counties.  In 1990 and 2000, the percentage of the creative class was not 
significant (see Table 8).  However, in 2008 the percentage of the creative class was significant 
at the p < .001 level for total crime rate, murder rate, and property crime rate.  This result 
demonstrates that as the county becomes less creative, the rate of crime increases.  The increased 
level of segregation discussed in the previous section may have an effect on crime over time.  As 
the creative class first moves into an area, crime is not a factor.  However, over time, as the 
creative class segregate themselves from the noncreative class, crime is significantly affected by 
the creative class.  This may push crime to other areas of the city because segregated and socially 
isolated areas do not experience the same social benefits of creativity, such as creative exposure. 
 For 1990, 2000, and 2008 the percentage of married households was significant for total 
crime rate, and in 2008 for property crime rate (see Table 8).  As the percentage of married 
households decreased in the county, the total crime rate increased.  This suggests that the move 
toward individualism that the creative class exhibits may increase crime in a community.  In 
communities with more married households, families can watch the neighborhood, which can 
lead to a form of social control in the community.   
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Table 8:  OLS Regression with Crimes in 1990, 2000, and 2008 All Counties  
 1990 2000 2008 
 Total Murder Property Total Murder Property Total Murder Property 
Unemployment -.16 
(.18) 
-.09 
(.25) 
-.19 
(.18) 
.17* 
(.09) 
.10 
(.17) 
.13 
(.10) 
-.11* 
(.01) 
-.07 
(.02) 
-.22*** 
(.01) 
Black % -.01 
(.03) 
.42*** 
(.04) 
-.05 
(.03) 
.09 
(.03) 
.44*** 
(.05) 
.07 
(.03) 
.05 
(.02) 
.33*** 
(.05) 
.04 
(.02) 
Vacant 
Housing 
.11* 
(.07) 
.14** 
(.10) 
.10 
(.07) 
-.06 
(.07) 
.03 
(.12) 
-.06 
(.08) 
.00 
(.06) 
.08 
(.13) 
.02 
(.07) 
Population .12 
(.05) 
.12* 
(.07) 
.09 
(.05) 
-.12* 
(.04) 
-.08 
(.07) 
-.18** 
(.04) 
.09 
(.03) 
.14** 
(.06) 
.02 
(.03) 
Married 
Households  
-.19* 
(.00) 
.04 
(.00) 
-.14 
(.00) 
-.16* 
(.00) 
-.02 
(.00) 
-.12 
(.00) 
-.35*** 
(.00) 
-.16* 
(.00) 
-.26** 
(.00) 
Individuals 
Below Poverty 
.26** 
(.12) 
.42*** 
(.17) 
.28** 
(.13) 
.33** 
(.11) 
.34*** 
(.19) 
.27** 
(.11) 
.18* 
(.00) 
.26*** 
(.01) 
.18* 
(.00) 
Creative % -.10 
(.39) 
-.08 
(.54) 
-.09 
(.40) 
.02 
(.27) 
-.01 
(.48) 
-.00 
(.27) 
-.26*** 
(.19) 
-.15*** 
(.38) 
-.30*** 
(.20) 
R2 .18 .51 .11 .29 .47 .19 .38 .48 .30 
N 342 322 342 304 284 304 304 294 304 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; Standardized Coefficients (Standard Error) 
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Surprisingly, the percentage of vacant housing was significant in 1990 for the total crime rate 
and the murder rate (see Table 8).  With the economic collapse in 2008 the increase in vacant 
and abandoned homes was hypothesized to have an effect on crime.  However, only in 1990 did 
vacant housing play a role in crime.  An increase in the percentage of vacant housing in a county 
was related to increases in the total crime rate and the murder rate in the county for that year. 
  The percentage of individuals below the poverty rate was significant for all crimes and 
years (see Table 8).  Again, as the previous section demonstrated, the creative class are 
segregating themselves from the noncreative class.  As the noncreative class move to areas with 
increased poverty, there may be an increase in crime. 
 Next, regressions were performed for urban counties.  A different effect for crime rates 
for urban counties was found than the effect observed when all counties were examined.  The 
percentage of the creative class was not significant in any model (see Table 9).  For urban 
creative class members, crime does not have an effect on where they choose to live.  This lends 
support to Richard Florida’s statement that that the creative class move to urban communities 
because of the authentic feel.  Other scholars have pointed out that the creative class move to 
areas that are seen as real and gritty (Zukin 2010).  However, becoming creative does not 
decrease crime for urban counties. 
 When examining Table 9, it can be seen that urban counties are differed from suburban 
counties.  For urban counties, the percentage of married households was only significant for the 
total crime rate in 2008.  However, for all counties, the percentage of married households was a 
significant indicator of crime for many different types of crimes in multiple years.  The 
percentage of vacant housing was only significant for the murder rate in 1990 for urban counties.  
Nevertheless, similar results were found for all counties considered together and for urban 
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counties for the percentage of individuals below poverty and effects on crime.  However, in 
urban counties the variable’s effect is more sporadic than in models with all counties.   
 The most revealing effect from Table 9 and Table 10 is that urban counties differ from 
suburban counties when examining crime.  The creative class demonstrates contrasting outcomes 
for crime in urban versus suburban areas.  This may be due to the different social structures 
found in urban and suburban areas. 
 When examining suburban counties, the percentage of the creative class was significant 
for total crime rate and property crime rate in 1990 and 2008 (see Table 10).  However, in 2000 
the percentage of the creative class was not significant.  It is unclear why the 2000 sample would 
not demonstrate the same effect as the 1990 and 2008 sample.  The effect on crime that the 
creative class has in suburban counties is on property and nonviolent crime.  Creative class 
individuals are able to protect their social space in ways that urban dwellers cannot.  Suburban 
homes have large yards where the homes can be defended through gates and other security 
devices.  Urban dwellers often do not have large yards or may live in apartments.  The close 
quarters leads to less ability to defend one’s social space.  Moreover, suburban homes often have 
garages protecting automobiles from vandalism.  Therefore, the creative class in suburban areas 
is able to decrease property and nonviolent crimes in ways that urban residents cannot. 
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Table 9:  OLS Regression with Crimes in 1990, 2000, and 2008 Urban Counties  
 1990 2000 2008 
 Total Murder Property Total Murder Property Total Murder Property 
Unemployment -.04 
(.25) 
-.02 
(.33) 
-.07 
(.25) 
.13 
(.12) 
.11 
(.20) 
.05 
(.13) 
-.12 
(.01) 
.02 
(.02) 
-.28** 
(.01) 
Black % .02 
(.04) 
.41*** 
(.05) 
-.01 
(.04) 
.04 
(.03) 
.46*** 
(.06) 
-.00 
(.04) 
.09 
(.03) 
.46*** 
(.05) 
.08 
(.03) 
Vacant 
Housing 
.09 
(.11) 
.21*** 
(.14) 
.07 
(.11) 
.04 
(.09) 
-.01 
(.16) 
.06 
(.10) 
.01 
(.08) 
.01 
(.16) 
.05 
(.08) 
Population .05 
(.07) 
.16* 
(.09) 
.01 
(.07) 
-.01 
(.05) 
.02 
(.08) 
-.08 
(.06) 
.06 
(.03) 
.16* 
(.07) 
-.01 
(.04) 
Married 
Households  
-.04 
(.00) 
-.01 
(.00) 
.04 
(.00) 
-.10 
(.00) 
-.07 
(.00) 
-.03 
(.00) 
-.24* 
(.00) 
-.10 
(.00) 
-.12 
(.00) 
Individuals 
Below Poverty 
.14 
(.19) 
.21* 
(.26) 
.16 
(.20) 
.22* 
(.14) 
.28** 
(.24) 
.19 
(.16) 
.18 
(.00) 
.18* 
(.01) 
.19 
(.00) 
Creative % .05 
(.58) 
-.12 
(.78) 
.08 
(.59) 
.14 
(.39) 
-.02 
(.65) 
.12 
(.42) 
-.11 
(.23) 
-.09 
(.47) 
-.15 
(.25) 
R2 .04 .43 .02 .14 .48 .05 .18 .45 .13 
N 204 195 204 180 173 180 182 178 182 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; Standardized Coefficients (Standard Error) 
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Table 10:  OLS Regression with Crimes in 1990, 2000, and 2008 Suburban Counties  
 1990 2000 2008 
 Total Murder Property Total Murder Property Total Murder Property 
Unemployment -.28 
(.28) 
-.18 
(.39) 
-.28 
(.28) 
.33** 
(.18) 
.06 
(.35) 
.38** 
(.19) 
-.03 
(.02) 
-.29* 
(.04) 
-.07 
(.02) 
Black % .07 
(.04) 
.45*** 
(.06) 
.03 
(.04) 
.19* 
(.04) 
.43*** 
(.08) 
.21* 
(.04) 
.14 
(.04) 
.26** 
(.08) 
.14 
(.04) 
Vacant 
Housing 
.13 
(.09) 
.02 
(.13) 
.12 
(.10) 
-.14 
(.10) 
.04 
(.20) 
-.15 
(.11) 
-.06 
(.11) 
.11 
(.23) 
-.06 
(.12) 
Population .21* 
(.07) 
.12 
(.10) 
.19 
(.07) 
-.27** 
(.06) 
-.25** 
(.12) 
-.33*** 
(.07) 
.09 
(.06) 
.12 
(.12) 
.02 
(.06) 
Married 
Households  
-.31** 
(.00) 
.15 
(.01) 
-.29* 
(.00) 
-.12 
(.00) 
.11 
(.01) 
-.09 
(.00) 
-.24* 
(.00) 
-.02 
(.01) 
-.18 
(.00) 
Individuals 
Below Poverty 
.13 
(.18) 
.66*** 
(.26) 
.10 
(.18) 
.22 
(.17) 
.27 
(.33) 
.10 
(.18) 
.07 
(.01) 
.40** 
(.02) 
.02 
(.01) 
Creative % -.34** 
(.51) 
-.02 
(.76) 
-.34** 
(.53) 
-.01 
(.42) 
-.09 
(.79) 
-.02 
(.45) 
-.36** 
(.35) 
-.20 
(.71) 
-.42*** 
(.36) 
R2 .28 .54 .22 .39 .38 .34 .34 .37 .27 
N 137 126 137 123 110 123 121 115 121 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; Standardized Coefficients (Standard Error) 
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CHAPTER SIX:  CONCLUSION 
 The current study examined many different aspects of the movement toward creative 
capital.  Some of the hypotheses were confirmed, while others were rejected.  The findings of 
this study do begin to shed light on what creative capital would mean for social development for 
cities and towns that follow the creative capital model.  A brief discussion of the hypotheses and 
findings will follow. 
Hypothesis 1:  
Suburban counties have more creative capital than urban counties. 
 Hypothesis 1 was supported.  The MANCOVA results demonstrated that for the years 
1990 and 2000 there was a significant difference between urban and suburban counties for the 
percentage of the creative class and the percentage of art class.  Again, caution must be used 
while interpreting the MANCOVA results because of violation of some assumptions.  However, 
the basic percentages of the creative class and the art class for 1990, 2000, and 2008 illustrate 
that there is a difference in where creative class jobs are located.  In all three years included in 
the study, the percentage of the creative class was higher in suburban counties.   
 Yet, Richard Florida and other creative class advocates have argued that the urban center 
will be able to attract the creative class.  Milwaukee attempted to upgrade the urban core and did 
not experience the social and economic boom that Florida has predicted (Zimmerman 2008).  An 
explanation as to why the urban core receives so much attention from the advocates of the 
creative class is the presence of artistic individuals in urban centers.  In 1990, 2000, and 2008 the 
percentage of the art class was larger in urban counties.  Artistic members of the creative class 
are more visible than other members of the creative class.  Accountants, engineers, and 
professors do not visibly demonstrate the “urban mosaic or hipster haven” (Florida 2008: 247) 
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that comes to mind when thinking about the creativity of a city.  On the other hand, artists, 
musicians, and sculptors can give an urban core a distinct feeling of creativity within the city.  
The accountants, engineers, and professors living in the suburbs do not give the suburbs the same 
creative feeling as the artists, musicians, and sculptors living in urban cores. 
 The failure to understand the growth of suburban areas is a fault in the creative capital 
model.  Businesses have moved and are moving to suburban areas for a number of reasons 
(Glaeser and Kahn 2001; Maine State Planning Office 1997; Squires 2002).  Suburban areas 
often have cheaper land.  This allows businesses to move to less expensive areas and build large 
office parks.  Moreover, as middle class families moved to the suburbs after World War II, 
businesses followed the workers to the suburbs.  Creative class employment was most likely to 
follow the people to the suburbs.  Glaeser and Kahn (2001: 33) explained that “it appears that 
manufacturing, and finance, insurance, and real estate” are more likely to move, while services 
are somewhat less mobile and more likely to stay in the city.”  The financial and insurance 
industries are the creative class.  The service industry, which Glaeser and Kahn are referring to, 
are low end service jobs. 
 Both Florida (2002a) and Glaser and Kahn (2001) pointed out that the people move to 
areas and then businesses follow.  As people moved to suburban areas, businesses followed the 
people to the suburbs.  Creativity and the creative class are now in suburban areas.  Businesses 
and people in the suburbs have better access to ideas (Glaeser and Kahn 2001) because of this 
movement.  Cities redeveloping along the creative class model should expect the suburbs to 
attract the creative class employment.  Ideas and innovation will flourish in areas with a larger 
creative class, which are suburban areas.  Glaeser, Kanh, and Rappaport (2000) demonstrated 
that newer developing cities have more wealth concentrated further from the city center.  The 
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higher concentration of wealth in suburban areas is an indication of highly educated and highly 
skilled creative class workers choosing to live in the suburbs.                
Hypothesis 2:   
As areas increase in creative capital, segregation within the city will increase. 
 Hypothesis 2 was supported.  As counties increased in creative capital, segregation 
increased.  Creative class individuals are moving to areas of a city where other creative class 
people live.  This has led and will continue to lead to segregation along creative and noncreative 
class lines.  The creative class is highly mobile, highly educated, and highly skilled (Florida 
2002a; 2008).  This mobility, education, and skill have allowed the creative class worker to earn 
a larger income than noncreative workers.  As the creative class moves into an area, the property 
value and rent will increase, which will drive out the noncreative class (Long 2009; Zukin 2010).   
 Segregation has led to many negative consequences (Cutler and Glaeser 1997; Fischer 
2003; Ryabov 2011; Yinger 1998).  One consequence of segregation is the decreased educational 
attainment rates for groups that are segregated (Yinger 1998).  Low-income students in 
segregated neighborhoods had lower levels of educational attainment than students in non-
segregated neighborhoods.  The creative class model is based on educational attainment.  Cities 
following the model should proceed with caution as some groups may be locked out of any 
educational advancement.   
 Moreover, employment for segregated groups will be affected (Yinger 1998).  Segregated 
groups will have less access to creative class employment.  This will lock many low income 
residents of the city into jobs that guarantee that they will be part of the noncreative class for the 
foreseeable future.  Lack of access to quality education and creative jobs will hamper any 
progress that cities attempt to have along the creative class model.   
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 Segregation also leads to loss of social capital and trust in the neighborhood (Leonard et 
al. 2010; Ousey et al. 2010; Uslaner 2010).  The loss of trust and social capital in the 
neighborhood creates negative social ills for the residents.  Charitable giving decreases in 
neighborhoods characterized by low social capital (Leonard et al. 2010).  Organizations that are 
designed to help individuals in segregated communities will be less likely to receive funds 
because of the loss of trust and social capital.  Furthermore, social networks, which could help 
noncreative class individuals acquire the needed skills for creative work, are less likely to 
develop in low social capital neighborhoods (Uslaner 2010).  All of these negative social ills are 
likely to increase for the segregated noncreative class in cities following the creative class model.   
Hypothesis 3:  
As areas increase in creative capital, creative exposure will increase. 
 Florida has suggested that the creative class will interact and spread innovation and 
creative ideas.  These creative ideas will then increase the economic development of cities able 
to attract the creative class.  The hypothesized relationship between the creative class and 
creative exposure was not supported.  While this study was not able to demonstrate that creative 
exposure only occurs for the creative class, the outcome may be due to methodological 
constraints of the study.  The creative class demonstrated that they were exposing others to 
creative ideas, but lower level data is needed to understand who the creative class is exposing to 
their ideas.  Counties are too large to be able to identify the exposure to creativity from certain 
groups.  The noncreative class may live in the same county as the creative class, but might not 
interact.  Moreover, the creative segregation variable was significant, which indicated that the 
creative class are isolating themselves from the noncreative class.  This segregation would lead 
to less interaction among the creative and noncreative class.  
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 The relationship between creative exposure and the creative class should be explored 
further in the future.  Many scholars have demonstrated that an increase in exposure to 
technology and ideas does increase economic development (Moss 1998; Schlichtman 2009; 
Wojan et al. 2007).  In theory, the creative class model should provide creative exposure and 
allow cities to grow economically.  However, Florida implied that all people, regardless of class, 
will be exposed to creative ideas.  This assumption is not clear.  If the creative class segregates 
themselves from others, then there will be no creative exposure to all people.  Cutler and Glaeser 
(1997) illustrated that African Americans living in segregated neighborhoods were exposed to 
less educated people than in non-segregated neighborhoods.  The same would hold true today of 
noncreative class individuals in segregated neighborhoods and their exposure to creativity.  
Hypothesis 4:   
As areas increase in creative capital, crime will increase. 
 The hypothesized relationship between creative capital and crime was not supported.  
However, this finding may be due to methodological issues with the data.  Many scholars have 
demonstrated that segregation increases the likelihood of crime (Browning, Feinberg, and Dietz 
2004; Mears and Bhati 2006; Morenoff and Sampson 1997; Wilson 1987).  Thus, crime would 
be expected to increase in areas that are segregated.  The findings of this study demonstrated that 
as the percentage of the creative class increased, crime decreased.  This could be due to the 
segregation of the creative class.  The noncreative class is living in areas with more crime 
because of the deprivation of resources they experience on a daily basis.  
 Moreover, the loss of social capital in segregated neighborhoods leads to more crime 
(Browning et al. 2004; Ousey and Lee 2010).  Therefore, scholars and researchers should 
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theorize that crime would increase due to the segregation that creative capital brings.  Future 
studies should utilize new methods to test the relationship between creative capital and crime.     
 In conclusion, this study addressed a topic with both theoretical significance and practical 
implications.  The creative capital model has experience enormous popularity among city 
planners and policy makers.  However, the creative capital model may not be the best path for 
some cities to follow.  Suburban and urban areas differ in their ability to attract the creative class.  
Also, the creative capital model is not fully understood.  Florida continually explains how urban 
centers attract the creative class, but this study demonstrated that the creative class choose to live 
in suburban areas.  Moreover, smaller cities may not be able to attract creative class occupations 
to their area.  This will leave small cities at a disadvantage when attempting to develop along the 
creative capital model. 
 Moreover, the social implications of creative capital are not fully understood.  Crime may 
decrease when creative capital is present in a city, but other factors may mask what is truly 
occurring.  The creative segregation variable was significant in the current study.  Segregation 
has been linked to crime, thus if creative class individuals segregate themselves crime may 
increase in communities that are noncreative.  Florida also argues that exposure to creative ideas 
will aid the city to develop by passing creative ideas from one person to another.  This may be 
the case for creative individuals, but if creative class individuals are segregated there will not be 
much exposure for the noncreative class.  The creative class may increase inequalities in the city 
by segregating themselves and then exposing each other to new ideas creating a permanent 
underclass within the city.  The creative capital model needs to be studied further before large 
scale implementation can occur.     
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APPENDIX A 
 
Counties used in Study 
State County County Type 
Alabama Houston Urban 
Alabama Jefferson Urban 
Alabama Madison Urban 
Alabama Mobile Urban 
Alabama Montgomery Urban 
Alabama Shelby Suburban 
Alaska Anchorage Urban 
Arizona Maricopa    Urban 
Arizona Pima    Urban 
Arizona Pinal Suburban 
Arkansas Benton Urban 
Arkansas Pulaski Urban 
Arkansas Washington   Urban 
California Alameda Urban 
California Contra Costa              Suburban 
California Fresno   Urban 
California Kern Urban 
California Los Angeles               Urban 
California Marin Suburban 
California Monterey Urban 
California Orange Suburban 
California Placer   Suburban 
California Riverside      Suburban 
California Sacramento Urban 
California San Bernardino            Suburban 
California San Diego                 Urban 
California San Francisco             Urban 
California San Joaquin               Urban 
California San Luis Obispo           Urban 
California San Mateo                 Suburban 
California Santa Barbara             Urban 
California Santa Clara               Urban 
California Santa Cruz Urban 
California Solano Urban 
California Sonoma Urban 
California Tulare Urban 
California Ventura Urban 
California Yolo Suburban 
Colorado Adams Suburban 
Colorado Arapahoe Urban 
Colorado Boulder   Urban 
Colorado Denver Urban 
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Colorado Douglas Suburban 
Colorado El Paso Urban 
Colorado Jefferson Suburban 
Colorado Larimer Urban 
Colorado Weld Urban 
Connecticut Fairfield Urban 
Connecticut Hartford Urban 
Connecticut Middlesex Suburban 
Connecticut New Haven                 Urban 
Connecticut New London                Urban 
Connecticut Tolland Suburban 
Delaware New Castle                Suburban 
Washington, D.C.             Washington, D.C.             Urban 
Florida                   Alachua   Urban 
Florida                   Brevard Urban 
Florida                   Broward Suburban 
Florida                   Collier Urban 
Florida                   Duval Urban 
Florida                   Escambia Urban 
Florida                   Hillsborough    Urban 
Florida                   Lake Suburban 
Florida                   Lee Urban 
Florida                   Leon Urban 
Florida                   Miami-Dade Urban 
Florida                   Manatee Urban 
Florida                   Marion Urban 
Florida                   Orange Urban 
Florida                   Osceola Suburban 
Florida                   Palm Beach                Suburban 
Florida                   Pasco Suburban 
Florida                   Pinellas Suburban 
Florida   Polk Urban 
Florida   Sarasota Urban 
Florida   Seminole Suburban 
Florida   Volusia Urban 
Georgia  Chatham Urban 
Georgia  Cherokee Suburban 
Georgia  Clayton Suburban 
Georgia  Cobb Suburban 
Georgia  De Kalb                   Urban 
Georgia  Fulton Urban 
Georgia  Gwinnett Suburban 
Hawaii Honolulu Urban 
Idaho   Ada Urban 
Illinois Champaign   Urban 
Illinois Cook                      Urban 
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Illinois Du Page                   Suburban 
Illinois Kane Suburban 
Illinois Lake Suburban 
Illinois McHenry                   Suburban 
Illinois McLean                    Urban 
Illinois Madison                   Suburban 
Illinois Peoria Urban 
Illinois St. Clair                  Suburban 
Illinois Sangamon                  Urban 
Illinois Will Suburban 
Illinois Winnebago Urban 
Indiana Allen Urban 
Indiana Hamilton Suburban 
Indiana Lake Suburban 
Indiana Marion Urban 
Indiana St. Joseph                 Urban 
Indiana Tippecanoe Urban 
Indiana Vanderburgh Urban 
Iowa Johnson Urban 
Iowa Linn Urban 
Iowa Polk Urban 
Iowa Scott Urban 
Kansas Johnson   Suburban 
Kansas Sedgwick Urban 
Kansas Shawnee        Urban 
Kentucky  Fayette Urban 
Kentucky  Jefferson Urban 
Kentucky  Kenton Suburban 
Louisiana Caddo Urban 
Louisiana East Baton Rouge          Urban 
Louisiana Jefferson Suburban 
Louisiana Lafayette   Urban 
Louisiana Orleans Urban 
Louisiana St. Tammany                Suburban 
Maine   Cumberland Urban 
Maine   Penobscot                 Urban 
Maine   York Suburban 
Maryland Anne Arundel Suburban 
Maryland Baltimore Suburban 
Maryland Carroll Suburban 
Maryland Frederick Suburban 
Maryland Harford Suburban 
Maryland Howard Suburban 
Maryland Montgomery Suburban 
Maryland Prince George Suburban 
Maryland Baltimore City Urban 
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Massachusetts Barnstable Urban 
Massachusetts Bristol Suburban 
Massachusetts Essex Suburban 
Massachusetts Hampshire Suburban 
Massachusetts Middlesex Suburban 
Massachusetts Norfolk Suburban 
Massachusetts Plymouth Suburban 
Massachusetts Suffolk                   Urban 
Michigan Berrien Urban 
Michigan Genesee Urban 
Michigan Ingham Urban 
Michigan Kalamazoo Urban 
Michigan Kent Urban 
Michigan Livingston    Suburban 
Michigan Macomb Suburban 
Michigan Oakland Suburban 
Michigan Ottawa Urban 
Michigan Saginaw Urban 
Michigan Washtenaw Urban 
Michigan Wayne Urban 
Minnesota  Anoka Suburban 
Minnesota  Dakota Suburban 
Minnesota  Hennepin Urban 
Minnesota  Olmsted Urban 
Minnesota  Ramsey Urban 
Minnesota  St. Louis                  Urban 
Minnesota  Scott Suburban 
Minnesota  Stearns Urban 
Minnesota  Washington Suburban 
Mississippi               Hinds Urban 
Missouri  Boone Urban 
Missouri  Clay Urban 
Missouri  Greene Urban 
Missouri  Jackson   Urban 
Missouri  Jefferson Suburban 
Missouri  St. Charles Suburban 
Missouri  St. Louis                  Suburban 
Missouri  St. Louis City             Urban 
Montana   Yellowstone Urban 
Nebraska Douglas Urban 
Nebraska Lancaster Urban 
Nebraska Sarpy Suburban 
Nevada Clark Urban 
Nevada Washoe Urban 
New Hampshire             Hillsborough Urban 
New Hampshire             Rockingham                Suburban 
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New Jersey                Atlantic Urban 
New Jersey                Bergen Suburban 
New Jersey                Burlington Suburban 
New Jersey                Camden Suburban 
New Jersey                Gloucester Suburban 
New Jersey                Hudson Suburban 
New Jersey                Mercer Urban 
New Jersey                Middlesex   Suburban 
New Jersey                Monmouth Suburban 
New Jersey                Morris Suburban 
New Jersey                Ocean Suburban 
New Jersey                Passaic   Suburban 
New Jersey                Somerset Suburban 
New Jersey                Sussex Suburban 
New Jersey                Union Suburban 
New Mexico                Bernalillo Urban 
New York                  Albany Urban 
New York                  Bronx Urban 
New York                  Broome Urban 
New York                  Dutchess Suburban 
New York                  Erie Urban 
New York                  Kings                     Urban 
New York                  Monroe Urban 
New York                  Nassau Suburban 
New York                  New York                  Urban 
New York                  Niagara Suburban 
New York                  Oneida   Urban 
New York                  Onondaga Urban 
New York                  Ontario Suburban 
New York                  Orange Suburban 
New York                  Queens Urban 
New York                  Rensselaer Urban 
New York                  Richmond   Urban 
New York                  Rockland   Suburban 
New York                  Saratoga Suburban 
New York                  Suffolk Suburban 
New York                  Ulster Urban 
New York                  Westchester   Suburban 
North Carolina            Buncombe    Urban 
North Carolina            Durham Urban 
North Carolina            Forsyth   Urban 
North Carolina            Gaston   Suburban 
North Carolina            Guilford Urban 
North Carolina            Mecklenburg Urban 
North Carolina            New Hanover               Urban 
North Carolina            Wake Urban 
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North Dakota              Cass Urban 
Ohio Butler Suburban 
Ohio Clermont Suburban 
Ohio Cuyahoga Urban 
Ohio Delaware Suburban 
Ohio Franklin Urban 
Ohio Greene Suburban 
Ohio Hamilton Urban 
Ohio Lake Suburban 
Ohio Lorain Suburban 
Ohio Lucas    Urban 
Ohio Mahoning Urban 
Ohio Media Suburban 
Ohio Montgomery     Urban 
Ohio Stark                     Urban 
Ohio Summit Suburban 
Ohio Trumbull Urban 
Ohio Warren Suburban 
Oklahoma Cleveland Urban 
Oklahoma Oklahoma Urban 
Oklahoma Tulsa Urban 
Oregon Clackamas Suburban 
Oregon Jackson Urban 
Oregon Lane Urban 
Oregon Marion Suburban 
Oregon Multnomah Urban 
Oregon Washington Suburban 
Pennsylvania     Allegheny    Urban 
Pennsylvania     Beaver Suburban 
Pennsylvania     Berks Urban 
Pennsylvania     Bucks Suburban 
Pennsylvania     Butler Suburban 
Pennsylvania     Cambria Urban 
Pennsylvania     Chester Suburban 
Pennsylvania     Cumberland Suburban 
Pennsylvania     Dauphin Urban 
Pennsylvania     Delaware Suburban 
Pennsylvania     Erie Urban 
Pennsylvania     Lackawanna Urban 
Pennsylvania     Lancaster Urban 
Pennsylvania     Lebanon     Urban 
Pennsylvania     Lehigh Urban 
Pennsylvania     Luzerne Urban 
Pennsylvania     Lycoming Urban 
Pennsylvania     Montgomery Suburban 
Pennsylvania     Northampton Suburban 
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Pennsylvania     Philadelphia Urban 
Pennsylvania     Washington Suburban 
Pennsylvania     Westmoreland Suburban 
Pennsylvania     York Urban 
Rhode Island              Providence Urban 
South Carolina            Charleston   Urban 
South Carolina            Greenville Urban 
South Carolina            Horry   Urban 
South Carolina            Lexington Suburban 
South Carolina            Richland Urban 
South Carolina            Spartanburg     Urban 
South Carolina            York Suburban 
South Dakota              Minnehaha     Urban 
Tennessee  Davidson Urban 
Tennessee  Hamilton Urban 
Tennessee  Knox   Urban 
Tennessee  Rutherford Suburban 
Tennessee  Shelby Urban 
Tennessee  Williamson      Suburban 
Texas   Bell Urban 
Texas   Bexar Urban 
Texas   Brazoria   Suburban 
Texas   Cameron Urban 
Texas   Collin Suburban 
Texas   Dallas Urban 
Texas   Denton Suburban 
Texas   El Paso                   Urban 
Texas   Fort Bend                 Suburban 
Texas   Galveston Suburban 
Texas   Harris Urban 
Texas   Hidalgo                   Urban 
Texas   Lubbock    Urban 
Texas   McLennan Urban 
Texas   Montgomery Suburban 
Texas   Nueces Urban 
Texas   Smith Urban 
Texas   Tarrant   Suburban 
Texas   Travis Urban 
Texas   Williamson Urban 
Utah  Davis Suburban 
Utah  Salt Lake                 Urban 
Utah  Utah   Urban 
Utah  Weber   Suburban 
Vermont   Chittenden Urban 
Virginia Chesterfield Suburban 
Virginia Fairfax Suburban 
100 
 
 
 
Virginia Henrico Suburban 
Virginia Loudoun   Suburban 
Virginia  Prince William            Suburban 
Virginia  Chesapeake City           Suburban 
Virginia  Norfolk City              Suburban 
Virginia  Richmond City             Urban 
Virginia  Virginia Beach City       Urban 
Washington Clark Suburban 
Washington King Urban 
Washington Kitsap Urban 
Washington Pierce Suburban 
Washington Snohomish Suburban 
Washington Spokane Urban 
Washington Thurston Urban 
Washington Whatcom Urban 
Washington Yakima    Urban 
Wisconsin Brown   Urban 
Wisconsin Dane Urban 
Wisconsin Fond du Lac               Urban 
Wisconsin Kenosha Suburban 
Wisconsin Marathon Urban 
Wisconsin Milwaukee Urban 
Wisconsin Outagamie Urban 
Wisconsin Racine Suburban 
Wisconsin Rock Urban 
Wisconsin Waukesha Suburban 
Wisconsin Winnebago Urban 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Descriptive Statistics for 1990 All Counties  
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Creative % .119 .397 .225 
Art % .005 .065 .011 
Black % .077 65.843 .104 
Unemployment Rate 2.100 14.300 5.652 
Population Density 5.211 53126.286 1317.281 
Foreign Born % .800 45.10 6.132 
Population 9646 8863164 472772.830 
Vacant Housing % 2.700 42.600 8.240 
Married Household % 26.120 76.070 57.326 
Individuals Below 
Poverty 
.030 .420 .106 
Age 17 and Under 15.800 40.100 25.466 
Age 18 to 44 29.300 59.600 44.342 
Age 65 and Over 3.000 32.300 11.827 
Creative Exposure -.116 -.002 -.058 
Creative Segregation .000 .083 .016 
Total Crime Rate 33.723 62367.821 1297.848 
Murder Rate .000 93.303 7.352 
Property Rate 28.398 55079.826 1038.093 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Descriptive Statistics for 1990 Urban Counties  
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Creative % .127 .391 .214 
Art % .005 .065 .012 
Black % .077 65.843 .125 
Unemployment Rate 2.900 14.300 6.123 
Population Density 5.211 53126.286 1595.650 
Foreign Born % .800 45.100 6.191 
Population 9646 8863164 528157.35 
Vacant Housing % 2.700 42.600 8.743 
Married Household % 26.120 73.230 54.135 
Individuals Below 
Poverty 
.060 .420 .128 
Age 17 and Under 15.800 37.700 25.138 
Age 18 to 44 30.200 59.600 44.481 
Age 65 and Over 3.700 32.100 12.349 
Creative Exposure -.116 -.002 -.040 
Creative Segregation .000 .075 .023 
Total Crime Rate 33.723 62367.821 1584.133 
Murder Rate .000 93.303 9.607 
Property Rate 28.398 55079.826 1259.387 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Descriptive Statistics for 1990 Suburban Counties  
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Creative % .119 .397 .240 
Art % .006 .032 .011 
Black % .169 50.707 .073 
Unemployment Rate 2.100 9.900 4.940 
Population Density 21.672 11768.063 1293.534 
Foreign Born % .800 30.600 6.043 
Population 57846 2410556 389696.060 
Vacant Housing % 3.000 25.700 7.486 
Married Household % 45.090 76.070 62.112 
Individuals Below 
Poverty 
.030 .220 .074 
Age 17 and Under 17.700 40.100 25.959 
Age 18 to 44 29.300 54.100 44.134 
Age 65 and Over 3.000 32.300 11.044 
Creative Exposure -.093 -.036 -.066 
Creative Segregation .000 .083 .013 
Total Crime Rate 53.124 2104.465 872.568 
Murder Rate .000 35.218 4.001 
Property Rate 46.586 1896.671 709.358 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Descriptive Statistics for 2000 All Counties  
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Creative % .142 .481 .268 
Art % .005 .061 .012 
Black % .300 67.30 11.463 
Unemployment Rate .900 15.400 3.578 
Population Density 32.200 66834.600 1464.077 
Foreign Born % .530 55.090 4.669 
Population 31435 9519338 537907.060 
Vacant Housing % 1.540 35.530 7.062 
Married Household % 28.800 73.780 52.237 
Individuals Below 
Poverty 
2.117 35.871 10.582 
Age 17 and Under 14.600 35.300 25.565 
Age 18 to 44 26.700 54.200 40.463 
Age 65 and Over 4.200 31.400 11.972 
Creative Exposure -.096 .249 -.048 
Creative Segregation .000 .083 .017 
Total Crime Rate 44.740 21797.360 862.840 
Murder Rate .000 133.609 5.129 
Property Rate 29.434 16577.064 646.135 
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APPENDIX F 
 
Descriptive Statistics for 2000 Urban Counties  
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Creative % .142 .479 .254 
Art % .005 .061 .012 
Black % .300 67.300 13.441 
Unemployment Rate 1.200 15.400 3.841 
Population Density 32.200 66834.600 1761.117 
Foreign Born % .530 26.890 4.492 
Population 88787 9519338 593852.320 
Vacant Housing % 2.320 35.530 7.776 
Married Household % 22.800 69.830 48.973 
Individuals Below 
Poverty 
4.695 35.871 12.621 
Age 17 and Under 14.600 35.300 25.043 
Age 18 to 44 26.700 54.200 40.955 
Age 65 and Over 5.400 31.400 12.390 
Creative Exposure -.083 -.002 -.035 
Creative Segregation .001 .076 .024 
Total Crime Rate 44.740 2226.664 908.900 
Murder Rate .000 59.870 6.189 
Property Rate 29.434 1549.444 669.495 
106 
 
 
 
APPENDIX G 
 
Descriptive Statistics for 2000 Suburban Counties  
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Creative % .155 .481 .290 
Art % .005 .037 .011 
Black % .400 62.700 8.497 
Unemployment Rate .900 6.200 3.183 
Population Density 33.500 12956.900 1018.517 
Foreign Born % .540 55.090 4.937 
Population 31435 2846289 453989.180 
Vacant Housing % 1.540 24.390 5.991 
Married Household % 36.900 73.780 57.133 
Individuals Below 
Poverty 
2.117 19.400 7.524 
Age 17 and Under 19.200 35.200 26.347 
Age 18 to 44 29.600 48.300 39.724 
Age 65 and Over 4.200 26.700 11.344 
Creative Exposure -.096 .249 -.053 
Creative Segregation .000 .083 .015 
Total Crime Rate 69.090 21797.360 795.606 
Murder Rate .000 133.609 3.581 
Property Rate 63.934 16577.064 612.038 
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APPENDIX H 
 
Descriptive Statistics for 2008 All Counties  
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Creative % .136 .494 .274 
Art % .002 .052 .012 
Black % .190 63.920 12.056 
Unemployment Rate 2.677 10.715 5.504 
Population Density 31.623 71763.129 1545.212 
Foreign Born % .880 49.850 10.645 
Population 98488 9862049 586910.020 
Vacant Housing % 3.390 40.420 10.041 
Married Household % 21.780 68.890 49.604 
Individuals Below 
Poverty 
2.270 29.883 10.579 
Age 17 and Under 14.660 35.870 24.207 
Age 18 to 44 11.750 49.550 20.325 
Age 65 and Over 5.820 30.330 12.360 
Creative Exposure -.084 -.004 -.055 
Creative Segregation .000 .071 .017 
Total Crime Rate 134.147 2225.414 772.413 
Murder Rate .000 29.913 4.135 
Property Rate 115.532 1481.540 590.516 
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APPENDIX I  
 
Descriptive Statistics for 2008 Urban Counties  
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Creative % .136 .494 .260 
Art % .002 .052 .012 
Black % .190 63.100 13.580 
Unemployment Rate 2.677 10.715 5.643 
Population Density 31.623 71763.129 1846.995 
Foreign Born % .880 49.850 10.305 
Population 98488 9862049 639334.580 
Vacant Housing % 4.300 40.420 11.143 
Married Household % 21.780 67.200 46.382 
Individuals Below 
Poverty 
5.429 29.883 12.506 
Age 17 and Under 14.660 35.870 23.963 
Age 18 to 44 11.750 49.550 21.446 
Age 65 and Over 6.350 30.330 12.678 
Creative Exposure -.070 -.004 -.039 
Creative Segregation .001 .071 .024 
Total Crime Rate 282.327 2225.414 880.911 
Murder Rate .000 29.913 5.280 
Property Rate 226.696 1481.540 667.533 
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APPENDIX J 
 
Descriptive Statistics for 2008 Suburban Counties  
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Creative % .161 .470 .295 
Art % .003 .034 .011 
Black % .400 63.920 9.751 
Unemployment Rate 2.822 8.720 5.296 
Population Density 60.954 12744.635 1092.539 
Foreign Born % 1.420 40.230 11.156 
Population 104475 3010759 508273.190 
Vacant Housing % 3.390 22.950 8.388 
Married Household % 36.040 68.890 54.438 
Individuals Below 
Poverty 
2.270 15.442 7.688 
Age 17 and Under 16.120 32.340 24.574 
Age 18 to 44 12.550 44.110 18.643 
Age 65 and Over 5.820 28.880 11.883 
Creative Exposure -.084 -.037 -.062 
Creative Segregation .000 .070 .014 
Total Crime Rate 134.147 1881.558 610.948 
Murder Rate .000 16.808 2.431 
Property Rate 115.532 1128.117 475.899 
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Correlation Matrix Creative Class 1990 
  
Creative 
% 
 
 
Art % 
 
Black 
% 
 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 
Population 
Density 
 
Foreign 
Born % 
Age 17 
and 
Under 
 
Age 18 
to 44 
Age 65 
and 
Over 
Creative % 1.000         
Art % .562 1.000        
Black % -.083 .055 1.000       
Unemployment 
Rate 
-.548 -.131 .366 1.000      
Population 
Density 
.080 .549 .311 .263 1.000     
Foreign Born 
% 
.163 .353 .030 .273 .453 1.000    
Age 17 and 
Under 
-.212 -.399 -.199 .176 -.217 -.139 1.000   
Age 18 to 44 .471 .284 .110 -.267 .075 .091 -.024 1.000  
Age 65 and 
Over 
-.333 .005 .010 .192 .065 .015 -.587 -.733 1.000 
 
  
A
PPE
N
D
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Correlation Matrix Creative Class 2000 
  
Creative 
% 
 
 
Art % 
 
Black 
% 
 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 
Population 
Density 
 
Foreign 
Born % 
Age 17 
and 
Under 
 
Age 18 
to 44 
Age 65 
and 
Over 
Creative % 1.000         
Art % .564 1.000        
Black % -.096 .013 1.000       
Unemployment 
Rate 
-.543 -.222 .126 1.000      
Population 
Density 
.124 .544 .230 .141 1.000     
Foreign Born 
% 
.089 .298 .057 .132 .293 1.000    
Age 17 and 
Under 
-.081 -.377 -.054 .294 -.176 .040 1.000   
Age 18 to 44 .348 .251 .191 -.214 .170 .100 .033 1.000  
Age 65 and 
Over 
-.368 -.014 -.052 .104 .001 -.056 -.605 -.734 1.000 
A
PPE
N
D
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Correlation Matrix Creative Class 2008 
  
Creative 
% 
 
 
Art % 
 
Black 
% 
 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 
Population 
Density 
 
Foreign 
Born % 
Age 17 
and 
Under 
 
Age 18 
to 44 
Age 65 
and 
Over 
Creative % 1.000         
Art % .497 1.000        
Black % -.102 -.012 1.000       
Unemployment 
Rate 
-.458 -.111 .126 1.000      
Population 
Density 
.136 .442 .207 .020 1.000     
Foreign Born 
% 
.243 .310 .002 .134 .380 1.000    
Age 17 and 
Under 
-.083 -.239 .042 .040 -.130 .145 1.000   
Age 18 to 44 -.037 .002 .073 -.094 -.038 -.082 -.173 1.000  
Age 65 and 
Over 
-.307 -.013 -.090 .233 -.011 -.142 -.630 -.266 1.000 
A
PPE
N
D
IX
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Correlation Matrix for Creative Exposure and Segregation 1990 
  
 
Creative % 
 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 
 
Black % 
 
Foreign 
Born % 
 
 
Population 
 
Creative 
Exposure 
 
Creative 
Segregation 
Creative % 1.000       
Unemployment 
Rate 
-.548 1.000      
Black % -.083 .366 1.000     
Foreign Born 
% 
.163 .273 .030 1.000    
Population .104 .204 .180 .523 1.000   
Creative 
Exposure 
-.109 .216 .256 -.033 .410 1.000  
Creative 
Segregation 
.072 .166 .319 -.015 .262 .373 1.000 A
PPE
N
D
IX
 N
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Correlation Matrix for Creative Exposure and Segregation 2000 
  
 
Creative % 
 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 
 
Black % 
 
Foreign 
Born % 
 
 
Population 
 
Creative 
Exposure 
 
Creative 
Segregation 
Creative % 1.000       
Unemployment 
Rate 
-.543 1.000      
Black % -.096 .126 1.000     
Foreign Born 
% 
.089 .132 .057 1.000    
Population .112 .129 .105 .417 1.000   
Creative 
Exposure 
-.125 .102 .147 .110 .193 1.000  
Creative 
Segregation 
.154 .050 .276 .069 .288 .121 1.000 A
PPE
N
D
IX
 O
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Correlation Matrix for Creative Exposure and Segregation 2008 
  
 
Creative % 
 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 
 
Black % 
 
Foreign 
Born % 
 
 
Population 
 
Creative 
Exposure 
 
Creative 
Segregation 
Creative % 1.000       
Unemployment 
Rate 
-.458 1.000      
Black % -.102 .126 1.000     
Foreign Born 
% 
.243 .134 .002 1.000    
Population .095 .149 .100 .524 1.000   
Creative 
Exposure 
-.141 .179 .186 .031 .447 1.000  
Creative 
Segregation 
.166 .118 .199 .042 .263 .379 1.000 A
PPE
N
D
IX
 N
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Correlation Matrix for Crime 1990  
  
Creative 
% 
 
 
Population 
 
Black 
% 
 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Total 
Crime 
Rate 
 
Murder 
Rate 
 
Property 
Rate 
Vacant 
Housing 
Rate 
Married 
Household 
% 
Individuals 
Below 
Poverty 
Creative % 1.000          
Population .104 1.000         
Black % -.083 .180 1.000        
Unemployment 
Rate 
-.548 .204 .366 1.000       
Total Crime 
Rate 
-.004 -.005 .016 -.008 1.000      
Murder Rate -.191 .231 .602 .420 .538 1.000     
Property Rate .001 -.020 -.008 -.027 .999 .511 1.000    
Vacant 
Housing Rate 
-.148 -.050 .102 .234 .101 .184 .093 1.000   
Married 
Household % 
.061 -.281 -.618 -.429 .026 -.448 .054 -.088 1.000  
Individuals 
Below Poverty 
-.464 .125 .451 .812 .034 .451 .015 .270 -.544 1.000 
A
PPE
N
D
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 Q
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Correlation Matrix for Crime 2000  
  
Creative 
% 
 
 
Population 
 
Black 
% 
 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Total 
Crime 
Rate 
 
Murder 
Rate 
 
Property 
Rate 
Vacant 
Housing 
Rate 
Married 
Household 
% 
Individuals 
Below 
Poverty 
Creative % 1.000          
Population .112 1.000         
Black % -.096 .129 1.000        
Unemployment 
Rate 
-.543 .105 .126 1.000       
Total Crime 
Rate 
-.099 -.019 .156 .117 1.000      
Murder Rate -.166 .052 .434 .195 .840 1.000     
Property Rate -.093 -.047 .129 .088 .994 .818 1.000    
Vacant 
Housing Rate 
-.388 -.083 .107 .235 .052 .141 .039 1.000   
Married 
Household % 
.153 -.198 -.621 -.161 -.167 -.339 -.128 -.154 1.000  
Individuals 
Below Poverty 
-.454 .184 .458 .628 .173 .344 .136 .342 -.625 1.000 
A
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N
D
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Correlation Matrix for Crime 2008  
  
Creative 
% 
 
 
Population 
 
Black 
% 
 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Total 
Crime 
Rate 
 
Murder 
Rate 
 
Property 
Rate 
Vacant 
Housing 
Rate 
Married 
Household 
% 
Individuals 
Below 
Poverty 
Creative % 1.000          
Population .095 1.000         
Black % -.102 .100 1.000        
Unemployment 
Rate 
-.458 .149 .126 1.000       
Total Crime 
Rate 
-.313 .043 .380 .170 1.000      
Murder Rate -.221 .130 .640 .238 .579 1.000     
Property Rate -.317 -.052 .301 .051 .937 .448 1.000    
Vacant 
Housing Rate 
-.321 .014 .273 .373 .267 .363 .222 1.000   
Married 
Household % 
.230 -.151 -.598 -.225 -.536 -.603 -.421 -.304 1.000  
Individuals 
Below Poverty 
-.453 .339 .410 .094 .485 .517 .403 .347 -.680 1.000 
A
PPE
N
D
IX
 S 
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